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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of integrating corporate and personal income taxes using a 
. ~ 
,/ 
stylized dynamic general equilibrium model of the United States economy. Simulation results 
\ / 
suggest that welfare gains from· i~tegr~tion are at be.st very modest, .17% of the GNP. Also, the 
average "long-run gains are three times as large as the average short-run gains. This 
intertemporal pattern r~flects an ~djustment lag in the inter!ndustry investment decisions. Under 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the efficiency gains from integration are much lower than under the 
previous tax law. This suggests that the change in tax regimes will improve economic efficiency. 
1 
Corporate Tax Integration in the Ur'\it~d ~tates: 
A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis 
1. I "trod u'etioD 
The objective of this paper is to study empirically the efficiency and distribution effects of 
integrating corporate and personal income taxes. It attempts to provide a comprehensive account of 
both the economic inefficiencies eliminated by integration and the distortions which are created, by 
focusing on -intertemporal investment decisions and optimal allocation of investment across sectors, 
on intertemporal household consumptionlleisure decisions, and on government deficits and 
. financial crowding out. 
./ 
! 
The corporate income tax has, long been criticized for it'S effects on the economy. First, the 
, . 
corporate .income tax introduces a wedge between the rates of return of capital in the corporate and 
in the non-corporate industries. Thus, the allocation of investment in the econqmy is d;storted in 
,favo'r of. the non-corporate sectors. Second, the existence of differentiated investment tax credits 
an~ depreciation allowances ~reates a wide variety of marginal corporate taxes across industries .. 
Consequently, allocations within the corporate sector are distorted. Third, the special treatment of 
capital gains distorts the financing of investment by inducing more retained earnings. Fourth, the 
tax treatment of interest payments distorts the financing of investment by inducing more debt 
financing. Finally, the corporate income tax represents a 'double' taxation of income at both the 
personal and corporate levels; corporate earnings are subject to the corporate tax, and the 
after-tax earnings are either distributed as dividends and taxed at the personal level or retained 
and potentially taxed as capital gains (See McLure 1979). 
The public finance literature often proposes to eliminate or reduce the distortions created by 
the taxation of corporate income by fully or partially integrating the corporate and the personal 
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income tax systems. Partial integration ihcludes allowing for di9i~e~d~ paid by corporations t~ be 
deducted at either the personal or corporate income levels. This would eliminate th!3 preferential 
tax tre'a,tment of bond financing. In turn, full integration is the complete elimination of the 
corporate income tax. Full integration is the only way fo completely eril1'!inate all the distortions 
generated by the corporate i'ncome tax. 
Empirical evidence on the issue of corporate tax integration indicates that integration may have 
. , 
substantial effects. In the path-breaking work of Fullerton-King-Shoven-Whalley (FKSW) 
(1980, 1981, 1985), total integration was found to yield an annual static efficiency gain of $4 to 
$8 billion of 1973 dollars. Simulated dynamic gains were found to be at least $300 billion, and 
could be as large as $695 billion of 1973 dollars, or about 1.40/0 of the present value of 
, ~ 
. consumption and leisure in the U.S. economy. Partial integration schemes,,- in particular, dividend 
, / 
, I 
'~xclusion from the corporate tax b~se, yield less of a dynamic gain. It is simulated to be be.tween 
$58 and ~260 billion of 1973 do'liars. Also,corporate tax integration is consistently a Pareto 
improvement. Corporate tax integration leads to a U-shaped pattern of gain.s for the different 
,consumer classes, with the lower and higher income groups reaping most of the benefits. 
The gains reported by FKSW result primarily from interindustry re-allocations of investment 
after accounting for the additional distortions in labor-leisure deci~ions. More recent work in the 
area of corporate tax integration emphasizes the importance of consumers' asset portfolio decisions 
and firms' financial decisions in the evaluation of the efficiency gains from integration. Slemrod 
(1980) focuses on consumers' asset portfolio decisions. In the context of a static model, he finds 
. efficiency gains from full integration which are about twice as large as those reported by FKSW. 
However, the difference should not be totally attributed t6 efficiency gains in terms of consumers' 
asset portfolio decisions. In fact, in Slemrod's model labor supply is exogenously determined. The 
distortions in the labor-leisure decisions generated by increased marginal personal tax rates which 
make up for foregone tax revenues, is not captured in his work. In the light of posterior work, 
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most of the ~ifference in the reported efficiency gains may be induced by exogenous labor supply, 
- - .. 

rather than endogenous portfolio decisions. Fullerton-Gordon (198~) focuses on fir.ms' financial 

d~cision~, in the context of the GEMTAP model (see Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (BFSW) 

(1985) for a detailed description of this model). -Debt-equity ratios are endogenously determined 

by trading-off the tax preference of debt against bankruptcy co~ts. Fullerton-Gordon report 

dynamic efficiency gains of about .6% of the intertemporal GNP from the elimination of the 

distortions favoring debt financing. However, when they elJminate the 'corporate tax and replace it 

with increased personal income tax, additional distortions are created in the optimal labor-leisure 

decisions. These distortions tend to dominate the analysis such that the overall effects of total 

integration are very modest, .5% of the intertemporal GNP at the very best, and may even be 

. slightly negative. More recently Galper-Lucke-Toder (1986), in the co~text of a static model, 

/ 
\ / 
. simultaneously consider consumers' asset portfolio decisions, as in Stemrod's paper, and firms' 
. \ 
financial decisions, as in Fullerton-Gordon's: . No single efficiency indicator is provided, but 

exogenous labor supply may bias the results upwards. On the other hand, it is suggested that the 

,way ass.et return variances are modeled, at both the personal ahd corporate income leyels, has ~n 

important impact upon the distribution effects of integration. 
The above results, as interesting as they are, may be severely biased upwards. There are 

several aspects of economic behavior and modeling crucial for the study of income tax integration 

which have not been captured in the literature. First, all the papers referred to above postulate 

government yearly balanced budgets. No deficits are allowed to occur. It is true that resource 

crowding out is still captured in these models, but financial crowding out induced by government 

spending is not. Therefore, the effects of corporate tax 'integration upon government deficits are 

ignored. However, inasmuch as increased government deficits are generated under integration 

private investment will face less favorable conditions. Secondly, there is no indepeQ.dent 

investment behavior. Investment is not derived from optimization behavior. In all the papers 

4 

referred to above, investment behavior passively accommodates eiiQoQert0us savings decisions. As a 
consequence, the differential impacts of policies in the incentives to save and to invest are not 
captureq. Thirdly, full capital mobility across sectors is assumed in all the above papers. 
Instantaneous and costless adjustments in the capital stocK are also assumep_ However, full capital 
mobility and costless adjustments rule out the possibility of different costs of capital across sectors 
and therefore of differentiated reactions to tax policies changes. Finally, the above models are 
either static (Slemrod and Galper-Lucke-Toder's) or a dynamic seque.nce of otherwise static 
models. However, the modeling of both government deficits and of endogenous real and financial 
investment decisions necessitates the consideration of a dynamic framework and the introduction of 
financial assets, namely government bonds and private financial assets. In turn, a dynamic 
. framework highlights the efficiency effects of integration on the optimal intertemporal decisions of 
. . / 
/
Jhe different agents in the economy., 
. . 
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy - DAGEM • to 
study the efficiency and distribution effects of integrating personal and corporate ~ncome taxes. The 
'economy is characterized by an incomplete sequential market· structure. Agents face a dynamic 
enyironment. Firms maximize the present value of the net cash flow in a technology with 
adjustment costs to determine endogenously optimal supplies and cptimal demands for the different 
production inputs. In particular, investment decisions are forward looking_ Real investment is 
financed by retained earnings and issuance of new debt and equity according to exogenously defined 
rules. Government intertemporal behavior is obtained from the maximization of a social welfare 
function defined over the domain of a public good and subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. 
The government is allowed to run deficits which are financed by issuing bonds. Optimal household 
behavior follows a life-cycle type of model generating endogenous savings and labor·leisure 
decisions. Household asset portfolio decisions merely accommodate to the composition of demand for 
funds.' Economic decisions are formulated in a context of uncertainty about future prices and 
. ! 
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interest rates. In each period, expectations are formed as point exp~ctations according to different 
,iflexible rules. The concept of Temporary Walra'sian EquilibrJu~ (TWE) is adopted to capture the 
incomplete and sequential aspects of real world trading and the limitations of foresight into the I 
future. All the market~ clear, hence the Walrasian nature of equili.brium. . Also, equilibrium in J 
the short run is such that market clearing prices are parametric on the expectation formation t 
.. 

rules, hence the temporary nature of equilibrium. 

Policy evaluations are carried out by co~trasting a base case, reflecting the status quo, and I 
several counterfactual, or revised case, equilibria reflecting different. policy scenarios. The I 
different eq~ilibria are made comparable by the use of the concept of equal yield generalized to 
. . I 
. accommodate the existence of government ~eficits. The 'information contained in the different. I 
I 
t 
equilibria is synthesized in a scalar policy evaluation indicator, Hicksian Equivalent Variations 
~/ 
. i 
.generalized to accommodate intertemporal comparisons when perlect for,esight is ,not assumed and Ifuture markets are not open. t 
~,Simulation results suggest first, that the net welfare gains from integration are at best very 
,I 
modest and frequently- negative. Such a dramatic change in the tax codes, like the complete 
I 
i 
elimination of the corporate tax and its replacement by increased personal income tax rates, is . 
simulated to yield long-run benefits which are never larger than .17% of the present value of 
future consumption and leisure. This is between four-times a.nd twelve-times lower than 
comparable results available in the literature. Secondly, it takes time for the efficiency gains of 
integration to appear. In particular, the average long run gains are more than three times as large 
as the average short-run gains. This new intertemporal pattern of efficiency effects reflects an 
adjustment lag in the interindustry investment decisions due to the existence of costs of adjustment. 
Thirdly, partial integration, achieved by excluding dividends from the corporate tax base, 
systematically generates negative effects. This is a new second best effect suggesting that less than 
complete integration may have perverse efficiency effects. Fourthly, unlike s~ggested in previous 
6 
studies, integration is shown not to be a Pareto' improvement acti.on. In terms of the value of 
current consumption and leisure, the lowest' income groups are worse off after the policy 
impl~mentation. However, all income classes show an increase in wealth accumulation and 
therefore the potential !or weifare gains at some point in the future. .Fifthly, under the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, the effects of integration show the same patterns and characteristics as under the old 
.. 
tax regime. However, under the new tax law the efficiency gains of integration are much lower. 
. This s~ggests that the change in tax regimes was in itself efficiency improving. In particular, the 
efficiency gains from both the new tax treatment of capital gains and depreciation allowances, and 
the elimination of the investment tax credits dominate the additional distortions generated by an 
. increased in the effective corporate income tax rates. Finally, the expectation formation rules are. 
shown to be of crucial importance for the evaluation of corporate tax integrati6n. 
• F/ 
/ 
.\ This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the DAGE,M model.. It discusses the 
foundations 'of economic behavior as wkll as the nature of economic. equilibrium and expectations. 
Section 3 focuses on model implementation issues. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence on 
\ corporate tax integration under different policy scenario~. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the 
results in the paper- and provides some concluding remarks. 
2. The Model1r 
In this economy there are three types of agents: households; industries; and government. 
Agents face a dynamic environment. The economic behavior of every agent is derived from an 
intertemporal specification of its objectives and constraints. Intertemporal transfers of wealth are 
allowed and economic decisions are forHard looking. To make their reat and financial decisions at 
each t, the economic agents use several types of information. They observe current prices at t. 
However, economic decisions are formulated in a context of uncertainty about future prices. The 
I j 
,I 
I 
. 	I 
I 
I 
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agents formulate expectations about future prices' w~ich are used~ to determine his intertemporal 

plans. Intertemporal consistency is not imposed: agents are allowed to commit mistakes due to 

incorrect expectations. Thus, plans about the future will in general b.e revised. The actual 

intertemporal sequence of plans is obtained as the contempocaneous period decisions associated with 

an intertemporal sequence of optimization problems. . 

The economy is characterized by a sequential market structure in a finite horizon and discrete 

time frame. At period t, the following markets are open: J consumption goods markets; physical 

capital good market, labor market; and a financial assets market. There are ~o future markets at 
 I 
any 1. The concept of Temporary Walrasian Equilibrium, (TWE), is adopted to capture the I 
incomplete and sequential aspects of real world trading and the limitations of foresight into the i [
future which we want to capture in this'model. All current markets are a~)ufued to clear, hence 
. / 
the Walrasian nature of equilibrium. Also, equilibrium in the short ,tun is parametric on the 

expectations of future prices he',d by the different agents as well as future taxation parameters, 

. hence the temporary nature of equilibrium. Actions of the economic agents' are based on 

. ,expectations which may turn out to be incorrect, i. e. price expectations are not self-fulfilling. 
2.1 Household behavior 
Intertemporal preferences of consumer group i defined over current and future commodity 

consumption/labor supply plans are' represented by a time separable felicity function of the form: 

where di is the time·invariant, subjective rate of discount for class i, and Uj(.} is a "Yel! behaved, 
time-invariant utility functi~n defined over the space of the J output goods yj' and leisure, Hit. 
t
" 

8 I 
• *. ILeisure is given ,by L rLit' where L i is consumer i's total available time. 

The consumer's behavior is constrained by a recursive set of budget constraints relating the 
 Iinterfemporal patterns of income, spending and savings. At t, consumer group i receives labor 
J 
. income, PLtLit' and lump-sum transfers from the governme!lt, Trit. Also: consumer i receives 
wealth generated income, which includes capital gains: 
( 2 ) [ ( 1 - I j e j t) r t + I j e j t ( 0 i v j t'p jEt -.1 E j t) ] Wit+ I j [ p jEt- p jEt:'1 ] E ijt 

where ejt is the share at t of equity j in total wealth of individual i, 'ejt=PjEt:1 Ejit'W it , and 

? Labor and wealth income are taxa~te according to a linear progressive in90me tax schedule. 
,/ 
.~ump-sum transfers from the government are considered tax-exempt. Capital gains are tavAd at a . ! -
different rate, CGTit. Accordingly t. disposable income at t is given by: 
... 
(3) bit+(1-Tit)[PLtLit+[(1-Ljejt)rt+Ljejt(Divjt/pjEt_1 EJt)]Wit]+Tri't 
where bit is negative to reflect the fact that marginal tax rates exceed average tax rates, and Tit is 
the marginal income tax . rate for household group i. 
At each t, PjtYijt represents pre-tax expenditure of group i in commodity j. Purchase of good j 
is subject to an ad valorem sales tax. Therefore the total after-tax expenditure of the i-th group in 
consumption goods is Lj(1 + Tjt)PjtYijto 
Given the information above, the recursive set of budget constraints _ the equation of motion 
for wealth - can for every t be written as: 
( 4 ) Wit+ 1 - Wit= bit+ (1 - Tit) [ P L t Lit+ [ ( 1 - !. je j t) r t + !. je j t ( D i v j t'PjEt 
1 
- 1 E j t) ] Wit] + I 
I 
I
E 
I
, 
/ 
i
.L 
9 

. The terminal constraint on wealth (5) implies that the total present value of current and 
future expected income receipts has to be equal the present value of current and future expected 
spen~ing. S.avings represent interternpor~1 transfers of wealth -to finance future consumption. 
Accordingly, Wit+1 represents the new total w.ealth at the end of period t to be transfered into 
period t+ 1 after all expenditures have been incurred. Additional wealth representing the total 
amount of new funds made available by group i to the rest of the economy is invested according to 
. criteria detailed below in this section. Savings generated by group i at t are given by 
(6) S u= L j[ 8 ijt-f: 1-B ijt]+ [8 igt+ 1-8 igt] + LjP j Et[Eijt+ 1- Eijt]· / / 
! 
Formally, at each period z the. economic problem of consumer group i can be stated as the 
.. .. \ 
maximization of the expected value at z of his felicity function subject to the recursive sequence of 
budget cc:>nstraints, to terminal state constraints, and to a sequence of future price expectations. 
'Such problem can be written as:21 
subject to: 
i) non-negativity constraint on controls for all zs;tsT 
* (8) Yijt~O for all 1s;j~J, OS;LitS; L i 
ii) eQuation ot motion of wealth for all zs;ts;T 
= bit+ ( 1 -Tit) [ p L t Lit+ [ (1 -L j e j t) r t + L j e j t ( 0 i v j tl p jEt- 1 E j t) ] Wit] + 
\ 
10 
iii) state terminal. conditions for all is;j~+1 (includes investment good industry) i 
I 
,j 
i 
t 
I, 
t 
. 2.2 producers' Behaylor 
• 
Production technology at each ,t is represented by a time-invariant ~eontieff structure of the 
form: 
The valu.e-added p~oduction function, VAjt= Fj(Ljt,Kjt), is twice c09tmuously differentiable, 
strictly increasing in every input, ar:1d concave. I\ !We· further assume that adjusting capital stock towards its optimal level is not costless. This 
. , 
idea is c~ptured by sector-specific cost functions "ea la Gould" (1968). defined over gross capital I 
. 'stock accumulation. The adjustment cost functions can be interpreted to include both acquisition , I
and internal,· non-market adjustment costs. The twice contin.uously differentiable investment cost 

function for sector j is:31 
 I 
The adjustment cost function has the following properties: 
The evolution of capital stock through time, reflecting actual investment, is given by the 
l 
J 
1 1 
equation of motion: 
. where 0 jt is th,e depreciation rate of capital stock installed in sector j at period t. 
r 
'The equation of motion of capital reflects the idea that, in the short.run, capital stock is, fixed, 
i.e., thecapit?1 stock in existence at t is not a decision variable aft, but it is determined by optimal 
decisions in previous periods. However, at t" investment decisions will be made determining the 
capital stock at t+ 1. In the long run, capital stock is variable. I 
Each sector of production j faces ad valorem taxes on the use of labor services, which represent I 
f 
. the employer's portion of Social Security taxes. Therefore, if TLt is the tax rate, assumed constant ~ 
, ~ 
across sectors of production, the cost for sector j of one unit of labor is giv~ by (1 + T Lt}PLt. 
. .. ,/ 
! 

As a consequence of its decisi,O,}S ~t period t, the .sector realizes gross profits TIjt - payment of 
 I 
f 
capital services plus economic profits, i.e., sales revenues minus non-investment expenditures: 
f 
Each sector j is subject to an ad valorem corporate tax on TIjt- The after-tax gross profits are 
(1-T cjt)TIjt' where T cjt .is tho sector-specific corporate tax rate at t. 
. On the other hand, investment expenditures benefit frem an investment tax credit which is an 
ad valorem subsidy. Actual investment expenditures are (1-ITCjt}PIt[ljt+Cj(ljt)]. 
,Interest payments are deductible from the corporate tax base so that the net interest paid on 
I 
Also, depreciation allowances DAjt are to be deducted from the corporate tax base. Let 0 jt and 
•K jt be the depreciation rates for tax purposes and capital stock for tax purposes, respectively_ 
I 

12 ,I 
, , 
The after-tax gross profits are increased by T cjt0 jtK jt-
Industry j's net cash flow at t NCFjt can be" written' as: 
, . 
= ( 1- T cit) ([ p j t -:E f{ a j fP ft) ] Fj ( K j t, l j t) - ( 1 + T l t) P l t.l j t} - ( 1 -: I T Cit)[ ~ It Ij t + C i( lit) ] . 
, . 
The disco!Jnted value at t of the intertemporal sequence of net cash flows is obtained from the 
sequence of current and future expected market rates of re'turn rt's. 
The producers' dynamic behavior with respect to real economic variables is determined by the 
." maximization of the present value of net discounted cash flows at each moment z subject to strictly 
convex adjustment costs, the equation pf motion for the capital stock, and futur,S:} price expectations. 
formally, this is for zst::;T, z::;s::;t, / 
(2 0) Max{y,l,1 ;K}Lt[TIs (1.;rs)-'11] NCFjt=L l[IIs(1 +rs)-1]. 
{ ( 1 - T c j t) [[ p j t- 1: f( a j;P tt) ] F j( K jt, Ljt) - (1 + T l t) P l t Lit] - ( 1 -I T C jt) [p It1j t+ C j (I j t) ]} 
subject te?: 

i) non-negativity cQns~ for all zstsT and 1::;f::;J, 

ii) equation of motion of capital stock for aU z::;tsT 
iii) state end conditions .. ' 
.., 
(23) Kjz=K j 
( 2 4) scrap value of capital at T + 1 is zero. 
1, 
1 3 I 
2.3 Government Behavior 
The government engages in four economic activities. First, it collects taxes according to an 
exogenously given 'tax regime. Second, it transfers discretionary Jump-sum amounts to the, private 
sector. Third, it purchases consumption goods, capital, and labor to accomplish general government 
activities through the production of a public good. Finally, since general government- activities are 
constrained by a recursive set of budget constraints, and.it is allowed to run yearly deficits, the 
government is also allowed to engage in the sale of public bonds to finance such imbalances. 
The government raises revenue by levying taxes on the private sector. It is assumed that the 
government knows exactly how to compute the tax revenue it is going to coHect at t. It is as if the 
. # 
. government knows the closed form net demands of all the agents in the ec~pomy and therefore the 
\ / 
tax base. The government can also infer future ta.x revenues which are relevant for current 

, 
 I
\ 
decisions from future price expectations. 

The tax system and tax policies are institutionally given as the outcome of a process not 
 I 
i 
~ 
,captureQ by the modeL Six classes of taxes are considered in this model as desc~ibed in the ~ 
preceding sections. The total revenues they.generate at t are accumulated as. follows: 
1. ad valorem 'Iabor tax on labor serVices used by the different industries U=i,...,J;I) I 
and government, representing Social Security taxes, unemployment insurance, and workmen's 
compensation and which generates revenue LTt: 
It should be noted that government is seen as paying taxes to itself on the use of labor. 
Consequently, the income effects of such a tax cancel out. However, the price effects measure the 
opportunity cost to government of hiring labor. Notice also that marginal labor tax rates in the 
private and public sectors are diHerent, reflecting better pension plans for government employees. 
14 

2. ad valorem corporate income taA on industry j=1 , ... ,~rgenerates revenue CTt net of 
ilJterest deductibility and depreciation allowances: 
~ (26) 
3. ad valorem investment tax credjts 1TCi, on "industry j~1 ,.:.,J;I, 
4. ad valorem sales tax generates revenue ST t: 
5. a progressive personal income tax represented by a linear function for each 
• 
generates revenue ITt: 
/ 
(29) ITt= L i { -b i+Tit [p Lt L ~ ti + [ ~ 1 -L j e j t) r t +L. j ej t ( Di v jtl Ej t) 1W/i t] 
.6. capital Qajns tElA: 
Accordingly, total taxes collected at time t are TIt: 
.Total lump-sum redistributive transfer payments, i.e., transfers to households at t (Social 
I 
! 
Security, food stamps, AFDC, etc.) are exogenously given and represented by Trt=LiTrit. 
The basic intertemporal conSistency requirement imposed on government behavior is that its I 
.. f 
actions are constrained by an intertemporal balanced budget condition. The discounted sum of all 
the government expenditures on commodities. labor, and new capital investment cannot exceed the 
discounted slim of all its. revenues, Le. tax revenues net of transfers. The intertemporally 
recursive sp~cification of the budget constraint can be written for each z~t~T in the form: 
I 
J 
t 
1 5 
. t(32) LG t+ 1 =( 1 +rt) LGt+[Trt+ 2.jPjtYgjt+( 1 + T g Lt}PLtLgt+P itlgt]-TT t~ 
with end conditions 

* 
(33) LG:z;=LG 
Optimal government spending is deri~ed from "the maximization of a social welfare function 
over the domain of an aggregate public good. Svch public good is produced using capital, labor, and 
intermediate inputs according to a well behaved production function. This publi~ good is not subject 
to market pricing. Accordingly, its production is financed by tax income and other sources of 
. government income. This optimization objective is consistent with our modeling of consumE~rs' 
behavior in which the public good does not enter the set of budget constraints and is not a decision 
,/ 
variable. This is equivalent to having the public good enter additive,!y in time t to the priv;ate 
utility functions. Thus the marginal' ratas of substitution between private goods do not depend on 
" the level of availability of the public good. The government is then assumed to act empathetica"y 
with the private consumers according to a constrained social utility maximizing problem. 
The social welfare function over the domain of the aggregate public good c;:an be expressed 
indirectly. in terms of a well·behaved, time invariant utility function defined at every t over the J 
commodities and labor and capital services: 
The intertemporal government preferences at z are characterized by an additively separable 
intertemporal felicity function of the form: 
where GIg is the time invari.ant subjective rate of discount for the government. 

The goyernmenes optimization pr:oblenl at each period z can be formally stated as the 

..
J 
r 
1 6 
maximization of .the expected value <;>f its felicity function subject to the recursive sequence of 
budget constraints as follows: 
subject to: ~ I"'0 1lQJl-negatiyjty constraints for all zst5;;T, 
(38) Ygjt~O for all j=1, •.. ,J, Lgt2:0, KQt2: 0 ! 
ii) equation of motion for government liabilities for each zstsT, 
iii) end conditions for government liabilities 
( 4 0) L<;3z=LG * (initial condition) / 
/ 
(termin~r .conpition) 

iv) eQuatjon of motion for capital stowk for all Z$;t5;;T 

I 
v) end cohdjtjons for government capital- stock 

* 
(43) Kgz=K 9 (initial condition) 
( 4 4) scrap value of capital at T + 1 is zero. 
2.4 Financial Markets and Financial Decisions 
The DAGEM model considers a whole menu of financial assets, private and public bonds, and 
firm-specific equity. In terms of equilibrium analysis, consumers typically supply funds and 
production sectors, and government typically demands. funds by issuing equity and private bonds and 
. ..l. 
'1 7 

puolic bonds, respectively. 
The current interest rate as well as the individual and market avail~bility of funds alre 
endogenously determined by the equilibrium conditions. On the other hand, individual asset 
portfolio decisions· are passive. Also, corporate. financial rules and retention policies are either 
exogenous to the model or follow exogenous reaction rules parametric on the state of crucial 
variables in the economy. 
The non-optimality of the allocation of saving and the absence or exogeneity of corporate 
financial rules reflect the way uncertainty is treated in the model. Uncertainty is solved by 

endowing tne agents with point expectations about future prices. Under such circumstances, 

J,
. consumers either expect different rates of return (inclusive of risk premium) across assets, in 

which case they will buy only one asset (that with highest rate), or they e~pect equal rates of 

. .,'/'
. / 
I 
I 
. 'return, in which case they are indifferent about the asset c<?mposition ,o'f their portfolio. Theret is 
no way of trading off rates of return arid risks' to' obtain an optimal interior solution to the probl,em 
I 
tof the allocation of saving. In the DAGEM all the assets are expected to yield the same after-tax rate 

of return' (eventually corrected by exogenous risk premia), and· therefore are perceived as perfect 

1
substitutes. Also, the endogenous determination of debt/equity policy parameters by trading off ,• 
I 
expected bankruptcy costs and the preferential tax treatment of bonds is difficult and problematic 

in the absence of uncertainty. 

Despite the shortcomings of the analysis, the consideration of different financial assets is very 

important. First, it allow consideration of exogenous debtiequity and dividend/retention corporate 

financing rules and therefore several sources of corporate investment financing: bonds, equity, and 

retained earnings. Second, it allows the model to capture the fact that different assets are treated 

differently by the tax code both at the personal and corporate income levels. 

Let us address now the financial declsions of consumers. Wealth VJit+1, representing the_total 

.... 
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amount of f~nds made available by consumer group i to the rest'~f t~e. economy, is to be inves.ted. 
There is a menu of assets in which savings FSit can be invested: private' bonds) equity, and 
government bonds. 
The 2J+3 financial assets are perceived by consumers as perfect substitutes, because all the 
assets are expected to yield the same after-tax rate of return.· Accordingly f the asset composition 
of the portfolio is a matter of indifference for consumers. The only Aon-trivial.finanGial decision i~ 

the amount of funds made available by the group to the rest of the econo'my. 

. . The actual composition of the portfolio holdings is determined by the market equilibrium 
conditions. Furthermore, the portfolio composition will be the same for all consumer groups. Each 
group i will own, at tf a' fr~ction of the market portfoliCi which corresponc;fs' to its share of the iotal 
t 
wealth owned by consumers at I.. -Accordingly, group i's holdings at t of equity and private and Ipublic debt are given by: I 
!
f 
To sum up, financial allocation of savings is exogenous to consumers but endogenous to the 
model. Also, the equilibrium conditions determine the equilibrium rate of return parametrically 
on corporate and government financing rules. Howevor, due to the, nature of the tax code, different 
consumer groups will have different after tax rates of return on their portfolios. 
,~t . 
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, ­
Financing its real investment, production sector j is consttained in the following way for all 
. . . 
Z!itsT: 
, 

with terminal condition FLjT+ 1 =0. 
This means that real investment activities and the paymenl of interest on outstanding debt at t 
are financed through retained earnings, REjtf ' and external funds, Fjt, which represent the 
increment in the financial liabilities of the sector FLjt. Financial liabilities must be liquidated by 

the end of the model horizon. 

,/ 
Dividend-retention policies are exogenously given. Corporate dividend-retention policies are 
! 
"represented by parameter 0njt' ,the fr~ction 9f the after-tax gross profits generated at t which is I 
f 
,I 
retained by industry j. The remainder, (1-0njt)' represents the distributed ~ortion of after-tax 
.1 
'earnings. Total dividends at t, (1-0TIjt)( 1-T cjt) TIjt, are distributed among the- t-th period i
shareholders. Notice that this criterion is cOr)sistent with the fact that the amount of capital in IJse 

at t by sector j is fixed so that gross profits reflect the existent capital stock and should be 

distributed among those who own it, the t-th period shareholders. 

Corporate financing policies are exogenously given. External funds totalling FDjt are obtained 
by issuing additional equitj' and fixed price bonds: 
Issuance of new bonds and equity is governed by exogenous continuous corporate financing rules 
represented in this model by parameter 0Ejt. Such policy rules can be described as follows: ­
..t 
20 

with end conditions, 
* * (54) PjEz-1 Ejz= P jEz-1 E j and PjETEjT+1 =0 
Perfect capital markets are assumed such th~t the price of eQ.uity at z ~Ejz is the present 
discounted ~alue of the future expected stream of dividends per share Divejt'Ejt 
Governm~nt deficits and surpluses, which represent changes in g~vernment liabilities, are 
/ 
accommodated by open market operations in the bond market. These' operations reflect ttJe net 
I 
\ 
demand for new funds by government: 
The two different methods of government "financing spending, taxation. and bond financing have 
different effects in the ecOnomy. This is a central issue in the model. 
2.5 Economic Equilibrium 
Atomistic competition in every market is assumed. Even though the number of agents on each 
side of the market is finite, it is assumed that enough agents are involved to render their actions 
negligible in terms of the overall equilibrium outcomes. The concept of Temporary Walrasian 
Equilibrium is adopted to capture the incomplete and sequential aspects of real worid trading and 
! 

, 

I 
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the limitations of foresight into the future which we want to captur!3 in this model. All current 
markets are assumed to clear, hence the Walrasian nature of ~quilibrium. Also, equilibrium in the 
short, run is parametric on the expectations of future prices held by the different agents as well as 
future taxation parameters, hence the temporary nature of equilibrium. Ac!ions of the economic 
agents are ..based on expectations which may turn out to be incorrect, i. e. price expectations are not 
self-fulfilling. Therefore, the intertemporal equilibrium path tn this economy is conceived as a Iseque~ce of short-run, temporary equilibria parametric on future price expectations. IThe link between adjacent short-run equilibria is provided by the -optimal transitions rull3s I 
for the individual agents. In fact, given equilibrium prices, consumers decide not only how much to J 
. purchase of the several commodities available .in the econom·y, but also how much to save, which is, I 
the change in the stock of privately owned wealth. The same !s tru~/ a60ut producers and 
./ 
\ I'government in terms of their decisions on the evolution of their capital stock and financial 
I.Ii abilities. I
fAn equilibrium solution for our economy is a sequence of price ve.ctors Pt and quantity vectors 
• 
, 
t 
; 
1 
The vectors satisfy the following conditions: 
i) For eacn and every 1~z~T, and for i=1 J".I, given prices Pz, consumer group i 
maximizes the expected value of its intertemporal preferences subject to a recursive set of budget 
... 
constraints and, point expectations about future prices p z={pz+ 1 ,· ..,PT}; 
ii) For each and every 1szsT, and for j=1 , ... J+1, given prices Pz, industry j 
(including the investment good sector) maximizes the expected present value of the net cash flows 
subject to the equation of motion of capital stock, strictly convex adjustment costs, and point 
... 
expectations about future prices p z={pz+ 1 ,···,PT}; 
I 
" 
... 
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iii} For each and every 1SZST, . given prices Pz' the gO\lernrnent maximizes the expe~ted 
value of its intert~mporal social preferences subject to a r~cursive set, of budget constraints and 
. * point expectations about future prices p z={Pz+1, ... ;PT}; 
iv} For each and every 1szST, given prices Pz' the J+3 markets in the economy clear 
* based on common expectations about future prices p z' individual preference pa'rameters V.i' 
technology parameters, corporate financing rul~s ¥j' an~ on sO,?ial welfa~e parameters and 
current and ~xpected tax policy rules ¥g. The market clearing equations are: 
L iyD ij(Pz;P ~z ;¥j}+YO Ij(pz;p*z ;¥,}+yDjgz(pz;p *z;¥g}+ L1 Sf~JyD fjz(PZ;P'-z ;¥f} 
j 
o * 0' * 0 * 8 *(60) 
-LjL j(pz;p z;¥j}+L ,1(Pz;P z;¥,)+L g(Pz;p z;¥g}=LiL j(pz;p z;¥i} 
(61) LjlTO j(Pz;p*Z;¥j}+IT OI(Pz;P*z,;¥,}+IO g (pz;p*z;¥-g}=18 (pz;p*z ;;~I)" 
(62)" 

. This economy satisfies Walras's Law for each and every zsT and for all current prices, i.e., the 
value of m~rket excess d!3mand is zero. This economy is characterizud by a system of J+;3 equations 
equating excess demands to zero in every market in J+3 unknown prices (J consumption goods, 
investment good, tabor, and the interest rate). However, using Walras's Law, only J+2 equations 
are linearly independent, and therefore only relative prices .can be obtained. Some sort of price 
"normalization is necessary. In what follows, the prices are defined to be strictly positive and to 
sum up to one, I.e. they are defined in the unit simplex. 
I 
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2.6 The Rules of Formation of Expectations t 
~ 
I 
1he information set at period t reflects what is known about the economy at t. It consists of all ,f 
the structural informatiQn of individual preferences and technologies" and a!,'the past equilibrium t 
i-
prices and .. quantities. Individual expectations at tt for all t+o1 .••T, are based on information as t 
specified in the information set. Price expectations are fon:ned as Hicksian point expectations i 
accordi,ng to rules to be specified below. In each simulation of the intertemporal model, the agents i 
maintain an, intertemporally consistent rule of formation of point price expectations. Therefore, 
the possibility of the expectation formation rules changing throughout time is ruled out. However, 
- the price expectations are updated when new information' comes into the information set. For . 
. example, the expectations of prices at't+h formulated at t and t+1 e will, i!> general, be different. 
'Finally, in terms of the the information structure of the economy it is ass'~med that all the agents 
have common price expectations; 'Th~refore, the possibility of informational asymmetries across 
agents is ruled out. 
The rules of formation of expectation are intended to capture the [imitations of foresight into 
the future, and are -therefore reasonably simple. In particular, the following three simplifying 
assumptions are made on the expectational price process. 
Assumption 2.1: Bounded rationality - Price expectations depend only on past realized prices, 
not other variables in 1St. This assumption can be interpreted as recognizing that information is 
costly to acquire and process, thus not all the information in 1St is used. 
This is a crucial assumption. The closed definition of the relevant information set excludes the 
possibility of the agents knowing, or at least using the knowledge of the model of the economy, hence 
the bounded rationality nature of the assumption. At a deeper level this assumption may be 
I 
\ 
construed as revealing the source of uncertainty in this economy. - if the agents· knew the model of 
the economy they would be able to accurately forecast future prices. 
. Ass~mption 2.2: Markov Assumption - The price process CPt} is at most a second order Markov 
'. . 
process, i.e., only Pt' Pt-1 help to predict Pt+l' Thus for all t: 
Assumption 2.3: Stationarity - The parameters of the price process are time-invariant. For 
each simulation of the model to determine the equilibrium at each period, the .agents will maintaifl 
expectations. according to a stationary process. Thus for all t: 
. "'" 
Several rules of formation of point price expectations satisfying the above assumptions will be 
/ 
/ 
considered. Let current price (or interest rate) be pz. Agents will form 'expectations at z of prices 
. \ 
h periods into the future, zpe z+h, (the first subscript will be dropped whenever it is not 
ambiguous) under several alternative rules. These rules are as, follows: 
i) Static Expectations: Current prices are expected to prevail into the future. For all 
h~O: 
ii) Extrapolative Expectations.: Expectations about future prices reflect the expected 
changes in prices in previous periods. Extrapolative expectations are obtained according to the 
recursive rule for all h>O, 
iii) Constant Rate of Growth: The expectations about future prices reflect the idea that 
the rate of change in current prices is expected to prevail. Forecasts are given according to the 
f 
t 
. I 
f 
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recursive rule for all h>O, 
iv) Adaptatiye E~pectatjQns: Expectations 'of future prices reflect current prices and t 
J,
preyious expectations, so that some adjustment is made for" expectation errors and new informatkm. 
The recursive rule is for all h>O, 
( 6 9) Pe.z+ h = P e z + h -1 + 0 (p e z + h -1 ··z -1 Pe z + h -1 ), I t, 
v) Auto:Regressjye Expectations of Order 2 - AR(2}: Forecasts ~re given according to 
the recursive rule for all h>O, 
Notice that if we set bz+h=O for all h, a1 =1, and a2=0, (70) reduces to )tU) static expectations 
,I 
as in equatio'n (i36). Also, if .bz'+h~O for all h, a1 =1+0, and a~=:~0, (70) reduces to the 
\ 
extrapolative expectations in equation (67). In turn, if we set bz+h=O for all n, a1 ::(pz/pz-1)' 
\ and a2=0, (70) reduces to constant rate of growth expectations in equations (68). Finally, if we 
,t 
. ~ 
equations (69). Therefore static expectations, extrapolative expectations, constant rate of growth 
expectations, and adaptative expectations are special cases of the AR(2) expectation rule as in (70) 
above. 
To calculate the short-run equilibrium resulting from the different expectations rules above, 
it is sufficient to replace in the equilibrium expressions in section 2.5, the future price and 
interest rates according to the expectation rules outlined above. 
'\ ' 	
.. 
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3. 	 Model Implementation and policy Evaluation 
The implementation of DAGEM involves the specification of a base case equilibrium, which is to 
be contrasted with the .revised case equilibria resuHing from different alternative policy scenarios. 
The link bf3twaen'the base case equilibrium and the revised case equilibria is provided by the 
concept of equal yield generalized to accommodate the presence of government deficits. The ranking 
. 	 among different equilibria is provided by .sc'alar welfare indicators,' the Hicksian Equival,ent 
Variations, generalized to accommodate both the absence of future markets and incorrect 
expectations. 
.;I
3.1 Base Case Equilibrium: 'Data Requirements and ~ara",!eter Specifi~atJon 
/ 
The current data set and the par~meter specification of the DAGEM is essentially consistent 
... 
with the 1973 data set and parameter specification of ttie recent version of Shoven-WhaaE~Y's 
\ GEMTAP model as reported in BFSW. The data set and specification was enlarged to cover 
aspects not considered in the GEMTAP. See Tables 1-3 for a detailed description of the data set and 
parameter specification in the DAGEM. 41 
The implementation' of the model in this paper requires the specification of a data set which 
consists of the initial values of the stock variables in the economy. The capital stocks for the 
different industries in the model are obtained from BFSW by applying an average after-tax rate of 
return to capital income. Industry specific debt and equity are obtained by applying the 
debVcapital ratios reported in Fullerton-Gordon (1983) to the capital stocks figures. The figure 
for government capital stocl< is based on the work of Boskin-Robinson-Roberts (1986) translated 
into 1973 numbers. Public debt is specified to reflect its current importance in the economyo_ The' 
1983 values of debt per capita and the proportion of debt to GNP are applied to the 1973 figures as 
, 

f 
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reported in BFSW. Since the formulation of the model assumes the. existence of a market financial 
portfolio with individuals allocating savings by buying shares of the market portfolio, it is enough 
to determine the composition of ownership of global wealth in the economy by income class. This 
data is obtained from the Office of Tax Planning as rep0rjed in Galper-Lucke-Toder (1986). The 
number of households in each income class is as reponed in BFSW. 
Bunning -the model requires the specif.ication of functional forms and parameter selection. For 
tractability, linear homogeneous Cobb-Douglas. functiona1 forms are chosen for all the utility and 
production functions in the current implementation of the model. Individual preference, 
government, and technology share parameter values, and the input/output structure are obtained 
from BFSW and correspond to 1973 values. Quadratic adjustment cost functions are postulatE!d. 
The value of the adjustment cost parameters is consistent with the valu~J (eported in Summers 
\ (1981) and Goulder-Summers (1987). Finally, the private capital d~preciation rates are f!rom 
Fullerton-Gordon (1983), and publi6 capital depreciation rate are from Boskin-Robinson-
Roberts (1986). 
Corporate financial rules are constant industry specific debt/equity ratios obtained from 
Fullerton-Gordon (1983) and the' constant industry specific retention/dividend r~tios are obtained 
from the Survey of Current Business (1983). 
Tax parameters under the previous tax regime reflect sector specific labor taxes, corporate tax 
rates, investment tax credits, and capital depreCiation rates for tax purposes as reported by 
Fullerton-Gordon (1983). Marginal personal income taxes are those in BFSW and capital gains 
taxes are set at 5% as in Goulder-Summers (1987). 
3.2 Egual Yield Alternatives and Revised Case Eguilibri~ 
The policy evaluation of tax changes is based on comparisons between a base case equilibrium 
\. ' 
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which represents the status quo and a series' of revised case equilib.ria which reflect the tax poli~y 
changes under discussion. The link between a base case and .counterfactual simulations is usucllly 
provided by the concept of equal yield: to be comparable, base and revised equilibrium cases should 
be such that the size of .government is kept constant in a meaningful way. 
Shoven-Whalley (1977) provide a detailed discussion of the concept of equal yield in a general 
. 
equmb~ium context. When government is confined to taxation and discretionary transfers, equal 
yield i~ interpreted to mean equal tax revenues. On the other hand, when government activities 
include pur~hases of private goods in addition to taxation and discretionary transfers, equal yield is 
interpreted -to mean constant "public utility." In this case, government base case utility is 
- maintained in the counterfactual experiments., 
In this paper equal yield is also assumed to mean equal gover~ment puOlic utility in both the 
- / 
'base and r.evised case equilibria. The intertemporal sequence of government cumulative utility 
. . \ 
{Fgtb, ... ,Fgrb} ,is retrieved from the base case. For :he revised case, government purchases of 
commodities will be such that at revised equilibrium prices, the base, case sequence of utilities is 
'attained at minimum cost. Thus government behavior is consistent with compensated demand 
functions for. base case utility levels. 
Running a revised case requires changes in the equilibrium conditions and the optimal 
transitions for the stock variables. First, the equilibrium conditions include government 
compensated demand functions rather than the ordinary demand functions as in Section 2.5 . 
Second, the government expenditure function in its budget constraints also reflects the compensElted 
demands. Accordingly, the revised case transition for government liabilities can be written as 
In Shoven-Whalley (1977), government is subject to a balanced budget constraint. With 
balanced budgets, the concept of equal yield is unambiguous. The new equilibrium prices and the 
t ~ 
I 
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balanced budget condition will determine the minimal expenditure and taxes needed to maintain base 

case public utility. Revised case tax revenues just match. revised case minimum expenditures. 

Accordingly, in general, equal yield is inconsistent with equal nominal tax revenue. Some change in 

tax revenue is necessary. Different tax replacement .schemes are considered to assure that enough 

tax revenue is collected. 

In the DAGEM, because government is allowed to run d~ficits, the concept of equal yield tax 
. 	 replacement needs to be refined. If tax ~revenues are. kept equal to new expenditures, the 
government supply of bonds_ is changed which introduces marginal financial crowding-out effects. 
Also, by k~eping either revenues or debt constant, there is still one degree-of-freedom since 
additional expenditures plus discretionary tran~fers and interest payment on debt, may be financed. 
via tax revenues, bond issuance, or both. Consequently there are several pos~'ible equal yield ways 
• ¥ /1' 
. . t 
'\of computing a replacement tax rate in the revised case. The optimal I~vel of expenditure for base I 
t 
case public utility can now be tax financed, bond financed or financed by a mix of bonds and taxation. ! t 
Some measure of financial crowding-out effects of government deficits can be inferred from the I 
! 
t 
comparison of the several equal yield alternatives. 
I 
The following three cases are considered. 	 j 
1) tax financed policy change 
In this alternative, equal yield is defined as the same utility level~ and same deficits. The size 
of the deficits is kept as in the base case. A tax rate is endogenously changed such that tax revenues 
make up for the expenditure net of deficit financing. Formally, this adds to the model the following 
constraints: 
30 f 
2) bond financed policy change I 
iThis equal yield alternative implies the same government utility and same tax .revenues. It 
. 
s~ould 	be emphasized that unlike Shaven-Whalley (1977) equal yield is now consistent with equal I
,tax revenue. Tax revenues are kept constant at base case levels. For different equilibrium prices, 
the same tax revenue implies endogenous changes in tax rates. Adjustment to deficits, and therefore 
bond issuance, makes up the difference between tax revenue net of transfers, interest payment on 
the debt, and the minimizing expenditure to achieve base C~S6 utilities. Formally, this adds to the 
model the following constraints: 
(74) 	 "ABg=PLtLgt(Fgtb)+LjPjtYgjt(F gtb)+PIt1gt(F gtb)+rtB gt+Tr.-TTtb 
(75) 	 TTtb= TT{(IT). 

3) same cortJpQsjJion of expenditure financ!ng / 

This equal yield aternative implies the sam~ government utility and the same bond-tax revenue 
financing mix as in the base case. Formally: 
(76) 	 ABg{ = [TTtb/ABgtbr1 n{(lT) 
I(77) 	 {1+[TTtb/ABgtbr1}TT{(IT)= 
PLtLgt(Fgt~) + LjPjtY gjt(Fgtb)+PItI.gt(Fgtb)+rtBgt+Trt· 

The comparison among these equal yield schemes is central to tax policy evaluation in the 
 I 
presence of government deficits. The three schemes differ in the marginal financial crowding out I 
they generate. Tax financed change blocks marginal financial crowding out by keeping debt at base 
case levels. Bond financed equal yield maximize marginal financial crowding-out effects by keeping 
base case tax revenues constant and by allowing deficits to make up the necessary adjustments. Case 
3 reflects an intermediate situation. 
f 
t 
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3.3 Tax Replacement Schemes 
The equal yield alternatives discussed above involve endogenous replacement changes in the tax 
rates. Different tax replacement schemes are considered to assure that enough tax revenue is 
collected. Tax replacements involve changes in the personal income tax rates. The personal income 
tax collected from individual i at time' t is in the revised case: 
(78) bit +[a ITit+b](Taxable Income) 
where a is a multiplicative change factor and b is an additive change factor. This lump-sum tax 
corresponds to a fraction of the total endogenous tax revenue change equal to the i-th household 
share in total wealth. 
The two replacemen~ schemes are obtained as follows: / 
/ 
1) myltiplicRtjye replacement - set b=O and let a be endogenously determined; 
\ 
2) additive replacement - set a=1 and let b be endogenously determined; 
In general, not all possible replacements schemes are feasible. The tax base that provides the 
\ additional revenues to match the tax revenues foregone by the policy changes has got to' be important 
enough to generate the necessary revenues. Otherwise, counterfactual equilibrium may fail to 
exist (see Shoven-Whalley (1977) on this issue). 
The three replacement schemes suggested here seem plausible on a priori grounds. Using the 
personal income tax as the base for the tax replacement in the context of corporate tax integration 
is conceptually appropriate in the light of the concept of "double taxation." Also, personal income 
tax as the base for the tax replacement in the context of corporate tax integration seems to 
minimize the likelihood of non-existence in that corporate tax revenues were about 8% of total tax 
revenues in 1985, while personal income tax revenues accounted for 460/0. 
J 
, 

3.4 policy Eyaluation 
( 
Indicators 
:32 f
. 
There are several ways of associating a scalar welfare measure to. the array of information 
which defines "an economic equilibrium. The concept of .Hicksian Equivalent Variations (EV) is 
among the most prevalent criteria to measure efficiency gains or loss~s in the public finance 
literature. EV measures at base case prices the maximum amount of money the consumer is willing 
to receive or pay to attain the revised case utility level. Positive EV's are to be interpreted as 
representing welfare gains. Individual compensation EV's are constructed by using optimal cost 
functions. Therefore they are "objective" money metric indicators. Aggregation of EV's across 
individuals does not pose any particular problem. 
The construction of an EV indicato'r from individual optimal cost funct!9ns In an intertemporal 
/ 
framework deserves some attention. Consider a consumer in an intertemporal framework. In I
t 
t 
general, the optimal intertemporal' cost function associated with a certain path of utility depends on 
r 
... I. all present and future prices. If all future markets are open, or if future prices are perfectly 
\ anticipated - the case -discussed by Pollak (1975) - there are no problems with the interpretation f Iand use of the intertemporal cost function and "a fortiori" with the computation of intertemporal 

EV. When some future markets are not open and/or future prices and interest rates are not 
 I 
perfectly anticipated, th'e concept of intertemporal cost function and associated policy evaluation 

indicators needs some refinements. Denton (1982) develops the notion of anticipated cost function 

to reflect expected long-run cost of utility. He also develops the idea of annuity costs ~ssociated 
with a constant flow of utility. 
From the standpoint of meaningful empirical applications Denton's indicators are less than 
ideal. The true compensation indices must be based on ex-post, one-period, optimal cost function 
parametric on future price . expectations, and not on an ex-ante anticipated cost function whi9h is, 
in general, Aot self-fulfilling. Also, the true intertemporal compensation indices must be based on 
I 
33 Ia consistent sequence of one-period, ex-post, optimal cost functions as'sociated with a certain 
utility pat~. This will, in general, involve non-constant utility annuities. The basic concepts used 
'in this subsection to build the true compensation inqices are: anticipated cost function, and 
'short-run and 10ng-run realized cost functions. 
Consider a sequential economy starting at z, lasting' T periods. Consider also two different 
(T -z).-dimensiona( equilibrium trajectoriep for an economy associated with different policy 
specifications: a base case equilibrium with prices {""Pt~, ... } and associated price expectations 
{ ... ,Pteb , ... }; and a revised case equilibrium with prices { .••,prt , ... } and associated price 
.' expectations { ... ,Pter, ... }. In both base and revised cases, the sequence of primal problems for the 
household induces a one-period utility sequence {U·.z, ... ,U· t'.~.,U·T}:/ This utility sequence 
./ 
..... * * generates a decreasing seque.nce of felicity {F t}={F z(·),···,F t( Pz;Pz+1 ,···,PT;W ), ... ,F T(')} 
i 
demand functions, consistent with the primal felicity sequence. In turn, the one-period cost 
- *. * * functions generates a sequence of cumulative future costs {C z(F z),···,C t(Pz,PZ+1 .. ··,PT;F z), 
Now, we want to compare from the point of view of the i-th household the two equilibrium 
sequences both in the short run and in the long run. 
If the i-th consumer correctly anticipates all future prices in both the base and revised cases, 
then all the plans into the future will be implemented without the need for revisions. In such a 
* * case, F z(.) is the actual intertemporal optimal felicity function at z. In turn, C z(') is the actual 
34 
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/ 
intertemporal optimal cost function at z. The construction of intertemporal compensation tests is, 
in this context, a straightforward generalization of the static case. 
However, If at z ~he i-th consumer cannot perfectly anticipate future prices, then Pz+1"",PT I 
Iare to be interpreted as price expectations, pe z+ 1 ,. .. ,peT anq not as actuai prices. Furthermore, f 
since expectations are not fulfilled. intertemporal prima' and dual plans will be revised according 
to a sequence of optimization problems. At eac~ z only current plans parametric on the expectation 
* of future prices are actually tmplemented. Also, only current utility U z and associated currE~nt 
* * * optimal cost SRC z are actually realized. Accordingly, the optimal functions F z<:) and C z(') are 
t~ be interpreted as the long-run anticipated optimal felicity function and long-run anticipated 
* • /' . 
optimal cost· functions ·at z, respectively . Since C z(.) reflects current costs and future 
/
.' 
anticipated costs of obtaining a certain; expected utility path level, as opposed to actual costs of 
!financing an actual utility path, it should be rewritten as C~z(.): 
I 
INow, (79) may be used to generate the EV indicator of the. long-run effects anticipated at.z of a 
certain policy change. 
Inasmuch as consumers do not anticipate correctfy future prices, the anticipated indicators ara 
of no help to evaluate either the actual short-run effects at z or the actual long-run effects of the ]
alternative policies. The relevant concept for short-run policy evaluation is the realized 
short-run cost function at z, which gives current realized costs at z as a function of current prices 
as well as future price expectations and a given level of feliCity: 
l 
I 
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The following is the associated realized short-rUn ey evaluation indicator: 
let us now focu~ on the long-run evaluation inqicators. The problem with obtaining such 
long-run indicators is ta get a meaningful sequence of short-run indicators which are' comparable 
and consistent for aggregation. We need first to construct a meaningful sequence of short-run 
optimal cost functions associated with an actual utility path, so that at each t the one-period costs 
reflect. current utility and are consistent with future observed felicity. 
•The true ex-post jntertemporal cost function over the period z to T, C z' c~rresponding to 
certain temporary equilibrium prices, future price expectations, and a given .felicity sequence is
" 

the present discounted value of the sequence of realized short-run cost functions: 

"'" 
/ 
/ 

. . 
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where rt and Pt are actual market prices and interest rates at t, and pe.t+h,s are expected values at 
· t of prices at t+h. 
To obtain the jntertemporal ey evaluation indicators, we Just have to use the long-run optimal 
cost function as described above. 
I 
3.4 Computation Techniques 
Given the temporary equilibrium structure of the DAGEM, the computation of a t-dimens~ona' 
\ 
I 
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intertemporal equilibrium path involves the computation of a sequence of t, one-shot, short-run 
. . . 
equilibria parametrically on price expectations. The model is typically run to prod~ce a twenty· 
y~ar eq~ilibrium sequence in a decision time frame of one hundred years. The optimal transitions 
of the stock variables between adjacent short-run -equilibria are determined .endogenously given the 
. I 
equilibrium prices and net demands. 

Each one-shot equilibrium is computed using NPSOL, an optimization algorithm developed by 
 I 
Gill-Murray-Saunders-Wright (1986). The equilibrium. conditions are seen as nonlinear t 
equality constraints in the minimization of an articifial objective functiCSn. The prices are 
- , 
normalized to the unit simplex by an additional linear equality constraint. The algorithm computes 
a'n equilibrium by finding a feasible point to this "bogus" minimization problem: by definition a I 
, ~ 
- feasible point satisfies the constraints of the problem, in this case the equ!!ibrium conditions. I
I 
The DAGEM is implemented using an interactive FORTRAN program running on a IBM 4381. 
. \ 
/ I 
The NPS9L algorithm proved t6 be extremely efficient for the computation of the economic t 
equilibrium for such a relatively complex model as the DAGEM. In fact it takes g.enerally about (me 
\ minute of terminal time on an IBM 4381 to compute a one-period equilibrium for an economy with I 
eight markets and a time horizon of one-hundred periods. For the same specification of DAGEM, I 
IMerril's (1972) version of the fixed-point algorithm takes about eight minutes. 
4. SlraylatiQo Besulls. 
4.1 The Design of the Polic\{ Exp-eriment~ 
Institutional Settings 
Two institutional settings are considered in this chapter: those before and those after the. Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. From the standpoint of this work, the two institutional settings differ in 
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crucial aspects. Let us begin by reviewing some relevant aspects in both situations. j 
Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, corporate income. was subject to a progressive tax I 
structure with a top rate of 46% for incomes above $100,000. Most of the corporations were I 
actually in the highest echelon. A wedge was thereby introduced betw~en the corporate cmd I, 
non-corpo~ate industries which made investment conditions more favorable for the latter. 

M~reover, marked differential treatment of incorporated industries had been induced by special 
 I 
I 
f 
provisipns such as the investment tax credit and the favorable treatment of depreciation allowances. 
The investr:nent tax credit was first enacted in 1962 and was in effect through . the end of 1985, 
except for -two short periods. Under this provision, a variable share of expenditures in new 
investment could be credited against the corporate tax liability. Since the share of new investment- I 
"" allowed to be credited depended on the type of capital, different sectors weJB differently affected by 
-'investment tax credit depending on the composition of their capita( formation. Under the I 
f
- . \ 

Accelerated Cost Recovery System of 1981, capital depreciation .allowances were treated very 
 t 
J 
... !favorably, permitting depreciation for tax purposes which exceeded the true economic depreciation. 

, Because the tax advantage was related to the life of the physical asset, different corporate sectors 

were differently affected depending on the maturity of their capital. As a consequonce of these 
 i 
provisions there has resulted marked differences in the effective tax rates within the corporate I 
sectors, which has generated further distortions in the intersectorial.allocation of capital. I 
The taxation of corporate capital has been seen as leading to the "double" taxation of income in 
that corporate income is taxed both at the corporate and personal income levels (see McLure 
(1979)). In fact, corporate earnings are subject to corporate income tax. After-tax earnings are 
either distributed as dividends and taxed again at the personal income level, or retained by the 
corporation and potentially taxed as capital gains. 
The tax law consecrated a preferential treatment of retained earnings. In fact, ret~ined 
earnings were only taxed as capital gains and therefore at a lower tax rate - 280/0. Furthermore, 
\ 
capital gains were (and still are) taxed upon realization, and the- time deferred treatment of capital 
. . . 
gains further favors retained earnings. Therefore, the tax treatment of retained earnings distorts 
. 
the financing of investment by inducing more retained earnings against dividends. 
Finally, interest payments on outstanding corporate debt were deductible from the corporate 
tax base. Payments on other financial intermediares, such as dividends, are not. Therefore, the tax 
treatment of interest payments distorts the financing of investment by inducing more debt financing 
I 
against equity financing. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changes some important parameters in the analysis of corporate 
tax integration. First, the corporate tax rates diminish. The top corporate tax rate and the rate 
. that most corporations face is now 34°k. Inasmuch as the low statutory rate may be passed intI) a 
. lower effective tax rate, the wedge between corporate and non-corpora ...te sectors will also be 
... / 
\ ' 
- reduced. In such a case, there are potentially lower gains to be derived,from integration. 
Secondly, the lower statutory'tax iates g6 hand in hand with a broader corporate tax ba.se. 
.... 
Investment tax credits were retroactively eliminated effective January 1. 1986, and depreciation 
\ allowanc;es made far less favorable. These changes reduce the distortions in the' allocation of capital 
across incorporated production sectors. Therefore, under the current tax code the corporate 
industries are facing more uniform effective corporate tax rates. However, given the broader 
corporate tax base the corporate industries may have to face higher effective corporate tax ra,tes. 
Actually, the presumption is that effective corporate tax rates will increase. Lower intersectorial 
distortions go in the direction of lower efficiency gains from integration policies under the new tax 
law. On the other hand, higher effective corporate tax rates will widen the gap between the 
corporate and non-corporate industries and generate increased distortions. Higher effective 
corporate tax rates go in the direction of lower efficiency gains from integration policies under the 
new tax law. 
Thirdly, capital gains no longer receive special treatment at either the household or corporate 
j 
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level. Capital gains are now taxed as is income from any othe~ source. The differential tax 
treatment of retained earning and dividends is thereby elimi!lated. except for the time deferral 
asp~cts of taxation of capital gains upon realization. At any rate the tax preference of retained 
earnings is alleviated .. In this margin the potential- gains from integration ~nder the' new tax law 
are unam~iguously lower. 
Finally. personal income tax rates were reduced by the Ta~ Reform Act of 1986. Thus the tax 
replac~ment necessary to accomplish integration under the new tax law will increase and so will its 
marginal distortionary effects. 
It appears that gains from integration under the new tax regime may be lower or greater than 
. under the previous tax regime. There are no a priori grounds for the results to go either way. _ 
Lower distortions in the allocation of capital within the porporate sect~!p""-together with lower 
. / 
-'distortions in terms of corporate dividend-retention decisions under th~/ new tax law. have to be 
weighted against higher effective 'corpdrate tax rates and the neces.sity of higher personal income 
tax replacements. 
Corporate Tax Integration Schemes 
Several ways of dealing with the distortionary effects of the taxation of corporate income have 
either been suggested or implemented in the United States as weH as in other countries. (See 
Pechman (1987) pp. 179-188 and, ceo Study (1985) pp. 141-163 for detailed discussions of 
different integration mechanisms.) 
Several laws for various periods in the U.S. tried to alleviate the "double" taxation of dividends 
and the tax preference for bond finanCing. In 1936-1937, a divideo.d:.p..a.i.d deduction was in effect. 
The corporations were allowed to deduct dividends from the corporate tax base. This effectively 
reduced the corporate income tax to a tax on retained earnings. For that reason this tax provision . 
was promptly eliminated. More recently, during the planning that preceded the Tax Reform Act of 
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1986, the U.S. ,Treasury Department proposed that 10% of the' dividends be deductible by 
corporations. This plan encountered some opposition from the 'corporation who claimed they would 
be forced to pay higher dividends as a result. This plan was not adopted by the Tax Reform Act. A 
dividend-received credit for individuals was in effect in the U.S. from 1954 to1963. Households 
were allowed to deduct 40/0 of dividends received as a credit against their income tax. Although this 
method provided some relief from the "'double" taxation of dividends, it was perceived as reducing 
the progressiveness of the personal income tax. When this dividend credit was repealed in 1964, a 
dividend exclusion was introduced. A basic exclusion from the personal income ~ax of dividends 
under $100· ($200 for joint returns) was introduced. This dividend exclusion. wa.s only eliminated 
with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 when the personal income tax base was broadened to make up for a· 
statutory ta~ reduction: 
/ 
In countries like Austria, Japqn, and Norway, a split-rate cQrporate jncoine tax has bl:3en 
adopted. . Retained earnings are taxed at a higher rate than dividends. This method is similar in its 
effects to a deduction for dividends paid. On the other hand, in cou~tries like France, Italy, United 
\ Kingdom, and West Germany an imputation method has been followed. All or part of the persc)nal 
income tax is regarded as having been paid at the source throu~h the corporate tax. 
All of the above methods provide only a partial integration of the personal and corporate income 
taxes. Full integration would be a way of completely eliminating a./I the distortions generated by 
the corporate income taxation. One possibility is a full integration mechanism in the form of 
partnership. Corporations would be treated like partnerships, and corporate income would be 
taxed at the personal income level whether distributed or not. The partnership method raises 
several difficult problems. The most important problem stems from having to impute corpolrate 
income to stockholders. To avoid the possibility of an individual having to liquidate assets to pay 
taxes on earnings he or she did not receive, the c~rporate tax ;s kept as a withholding device. 
Corporations under this full integration mechanism are treated as closely held corporation are 
I 
, 

I 
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treated under the current tax law. Corporations impute retained earnings among the shareholders I 
in order to withhold their income taxes. Shareholders, in turn, include both imputed and actual 

dividends in their tax base and would deduct the tax withheld by the firm from their tax payments. 

An alternative approach of achieving full integration is 10 repear the corporate income tax. All 

corporate income would be fully taxed at the personal ilicome level. -This scheme poses fewer 

implementation problems than the partnership method. 

In this dissertation, two integration methods are considered. The first method is a partial 

integration scheme. It is - designed to partially reduce or eliminate the :double" taxation of 

dividends, ,as well as the bias against equity financing. The second method is a full integration plan . 

• 
i) Method 1; partial Integration by Diyidend Deduction from the Corporate Tax 8as..e.. 

A variant of this method was in effect in the U.S. from 1936-1937, a~ was proposed in the 

/ 
'debate preceding the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
Partial integration promotes equ~1 treatment of dividends and interest payments, while 
maintaining a corporate tax; This partial integration method specifies that dividends can be fully 
\ deducted from the corporate income tax base. This eliminates the "double" taxation of dividends. 
Also, under this partial integration scheme the same treatment is given to dividends and interest 
payments on debt. This eliminates the tax preference towards debt. Equal tax treatment of 
dividends induces more equity financing and encourages dividend outlays. 
Because dividends are now deductible, the corporate tax is levied solely on retained earning. 

Therefore, this method discourages internal financing. This may be an undesirable feature when 

large deficits generate important financial crowding-out effects and tight fund mark~ts. 

This partial integration scheme assumes particular importance in the light of the recent Tax 

Reform Act of 1986. In fact, unlike the other distortions, the issues of "double" taxation of 

dividends and the tax pre.ference towards debt were not addressed by the Tax Reform Act. If 
 I 
I 
1 
anything, matters were made worse by the elimination of the basic deduction for dividends received 
r 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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at the personal income level. 
. ii) Method 2 - Full Integration Achjeved by Repealing the Co[porflte Income Tax 
Under this full integration scheme the corporate income tax is eliminated and individual income 
taxes are paid on both corporate dividends and retained earnings. According to this scheme the 
distortions associated with the taxation of corporate capital are completely. eliminated. 
Fun integration seems to have some political clout and occasionally has been suggested. For 
example, in 1977 full integration was advocated by a g~oup of experts from the U.S. Treasury 
Department in "Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform. Also, in early 1983 the repeal of the corporate 
income tax was suggested in an offhand remark by President Reagan. 
Given the different nature of the two plans above, different efficiency effects are to be expected. 
, ~ 
The efficiency gains under full integration are potentially large whep compared to partial 
'integration, because all the distortions are eliminated. However, the foregone tax revenues that 
have to be· recovered through replacement mechanisms are higher under full integration. The 
relative size of the net effecl of full integration is unclear on "a priori" grounds. 
4.2 Corporate Tax Integration under the Previous Tax Law 
The previous tax .-regime has provided the first institutional setting for the analYSis of 
integration. In all the basic simulation experiments, static expectation are maintained. This makes 
the results in this work directly comparable to the previous literature. 
Efficiency Effects of Integration 

PROPOSITION # 1 

The efficiency gains from such a radical measure as the elimination of the corporate inconle tax 
are at best· very modest. The efficiency gains predicted by the DAGEM are well below previous 
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estimates in the literature. 
Simulation results for full integration are reported in Tables 4-5. T~e efficiency gains from . I 
. such a radical measure as the elimination of the corporate income tax are at best very modest. 
I 
r 
. 

Under the best scenario, the elimination of the corporate income tax under multiplicative 

replacement has long-run welfare effects which are positive but relative IX low. The gains range 
from' 55 to 58 billions of 1973 dollars or .158% to .165% of the present discounted value of 
consumptiom and leisure, the adjusted GNP. On the oth~r hand, the elimination of the corporate 
income tax under additive replacement has long-run welfare effects which are. negative and range 
from -.098% to -.112% of the present value of the adjusted GNP. 
The efficiency gains reported are certainly a minuscule proportion of the adjusted GNP. To put 
things in perspective let us compare' the efficiency gains to the corpor.ate tax revenues. The 
\ , 
corporate tax revenues have been about 2°k of GNP or 1.4 % of the adjusted GNP. Therefore, the 
, 
efficiency gains from integration are \ at the very best about 12% of corporate tax revenues 
eliminated by integration. . 
The efficiency gains predicted by the DAGEM are well below previous estimates in the 
literature. That is to be expected since the DAGEM has been designed to provide a better account of 
both the benefits of integration and the distortions integration creates. In their path- breaking 
work, FKSW concentrate on the benefits induced by integration on inter-industry allocations of 
investment and on the intertemporal allocation of consumption. Total integration with lump-sum 
replacement was found to yield dynamic gains as large as $695 billion of 1973 dollars, or about 
1.4% of the present value of consumption and leisure in the U.S. economy. Dynamic gains under 
multiplicative replacement are of the order of .62% of the present value of the intertemporal 
adjusted GNP. 
The long-run gains- from full integration simulated with the DAGEM are about four-Jimes 
lower than comparable results in FKSW. This difference can be attributed to two factors. First, in 
\ 
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the DAGEM model investment decisions are subject to rigidities. Therefore, lower efficiency gains 
are to be expected. Secondly, while both models capture intertem~oral consumption and . 
labor-leisure decisions, the endogenously recursive nature of equilibrium in this paper better 
captures distortions induced by higher marginal income tax- rates. It should be stressed that under 
Value Added Tax and lump-sum replacements FKSW'find efficiency gains which are about twice as 
big as with multiplicative replacement. This suggests that we might have found higher efficiency 
gains had these alternative replacement schemes been tried. Nevertheless, the results with DAGEM 
would still b~ substantially lower. 
In the context of a model similar to the one in FKSW, Fulierton·Gordon (1983) focus on the 
-optimality of firms' financial decisions. They report efficiency gains of .60/0 of the GNP from the 
elimination of the tax distortions favoring debt. However, when they eli~~afe the corporate tax 
.. .../ 
and replace it with increased personal income tax rates, additional distortions are created in the 
optimal labor·leisure decisions. - Tties~ distortions tend to dominate the analysis such that the 
... 
_overall effects of total integration ~nder additive replacement are slightly negative ·.058% of the 
\ present value of the intertemporal adjusted GNP. 
The long-run negative effects from fuJI integration in the DAGEM are more than four-times 
greater than comparable results in Fullerton-Gordon. Given the similarity of the two models the 
reasons that explain the differences in the results between DAGEM and FKSW also explain the 
differences between DAGEM and Fullerton-Gordon. Presumably, the difference between DAGEM and 
Fullerton-Gordon would have been lower had the DAGEM been modeled 10 capture endogenously the 
debt-equity decisions. Nevertheless, the results with DAGEM would still be substal)tia!ly lower. 
SJemrod (1980,1983) develops a static general equilibrium model focusing on consumers' 
asset portfolio decisions. He finds static efficiency gains which are about twice as large as those 
reported by FKSW. Despite the fact that an additional source of efficiency gains from integration 
is modeled. in the form of household portfolio decisions, the results in Slemrod are overly 
: ~r ­
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optimistic. First, Slemrod's model is static. Second, labor sup~y is fixed exogenously. However, 
. . . 
distortions in the intertemporal leisure-labor decisions induced by the replacement mechanisms 
have been shown in FKSW and Fullerton-Gordon (1983) to be of primordial importance (see 
I 

Proposition #3 below for confirming evidence). I 
PROPOSITION #2 
Results from integration foJ/ow a sharply increasing intertemporal pattern: long-run average I 
benefits are much larger than short-run average benefits. 
The intertemporal pattern of efficiency gains from integration is characterized by relatively 
small short .. run gains followed by relatively large long-run gains.5f Multiplicative replacement 
. short-run average results are about .07%. of the discounted present value of short-run adjusted 
-
. GNP, while in the long run welfare effects are about .165%. Therefore, ayerage long-run benefits 
\' / 
are more than twice as large as the average short-run benefits, which implies a sharply increasing 
efficiency pattern. This is a persistent\ patten1 in the simulation experiments. 
" This intertemporal pattern is explained in part by the existence of adjustment costs. Since 
\ capital .is not perfectly mobile across sectors and it takes time for capital to adjust towards the 
optimal levels, it also takes time -for the investment efficiency effects to take place. The full 
benefits of integration in the allocation of capitaf in the economy will only be reaped in the long 
run. 
Other important factors for the intertemporal pattern of efficiency gains are the distortions 
generated by the replacement mechanisms in the intertemporal labor-leisure decisions. In fact, 
for both bond-financed and mixed-financed equal yield and unlike tax-financed equal yield, the 
average long-run replacement is smalfer than the average short-run replacement. In the two 
cases the intertemporal pattern is even more marked: average long-run benefits are about three 
times as large as the average short-run benefits. 
PROPOSITION !t..J 
\ 
I 
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The distortions induced by the tax replacement mechanisms on the intertemporal labor·leisure 
decisions' are of primordial importance in terms of the efficiency effects o~ integration. 
The complete elimination of the corporate income tax under the best- scenario of tax financed 
equal yield and multiplicative replacement would require· a permanent increase in the personal 
. . 
income tax rates of around 120/0. The distortions induced by the tax repl.acement mechanisms on 
the intertemporal labor-leisure decisions are of primordial importance in terms of the efficiency 
effects of integration. This idea which has previously. been suggested in the literature (see 
Fullerton-Gordon (1983)) is . confirmed by the simulation results in this dissertation. 
The efficiency benefits from integration are inversely related to the size of change in 'the 
personal income tax rates. With full integration, tax financed equal yield requires the lowest 
- ~ 
increase in personal tax rates and yields the highest efficiency results. In tl)tn, bond financed equal 
/ 
\ I 
. yield requires the largest increase in personal tax rates and yields the lowest efficiency results. 
, 
\ 
This is a persistent pattern in the simulation experiments. l 
Also, the relative differe"nce in efficiency gains among the several equal yield alternatives is 
\ directly related to the differences in the tax replacement factor. Tax financed produces ben1efits I 
2.5% higher than mixed financed and requires a tax replacement which is 2AO/o lower. In turn, 
mixed financed produces benefits 1.3% higher than bond financed. and requires a tax replacement 
which is 1.3% tower. On average, a 1% increase in the tax replacement generates a 10/0 decrease 
in the efficiency benefits. This is a persistent pattern in all the simulation experiments. 
PROPOSITION #4 
Regardless of the equal yield strategy,. the n-lultiplicative replacement scheme yields higher 

efficiency benefits than additive replacement. 

In the previous literature, in particular in FKSW the additive replacement is less 

distortionary than multiplicative replacement. The opposite is true in the Simulations in. this 

dissertation: There is nothing counterintuitive about this fact. It has to do exclusively with the 

47 
specific data used in the DAGEM model. 
It can be shown that in the DAGEM the additive replacement actually leads to an hi.gher increase 
. 
i~ the marginal tax rates than the multiplicative replacement, and therefore to higher distortions. 
Under tax-financed equal yield, the lowest income class would be subject to a personal inc0me tax 
.rate of 11.21 % under the multiplicative replacement and to a tax rate of 12.6% under additive 
replacement. In turn, the highest income group would be subject to a personal income tax rate of 
33.6% under the multiplicative replacement and to ~ tax rate of 32.6% under additive 
replacement. Given the household income distribution and the relative size of each household group 
in the DAGEM model, the additive replacement corresponds to an higher distortionary factor than 
the multiplicative replacement. 
The fact that with additive replacement the efficiency effects are actu~py ""negatives, reinforces 
. / 
'the idea of the primordial importance of the intertomporal distortions in the labor-leisure 
. ~ 
decisions introduced by the replacement mech'anisrn. Under additive replacement, the increase on 
" the personal marginal tax rates is 13% higher than under multiplicative replacement. The 
, inverse. relation between efficiency benefits and the changes in the marginal tax rates is here 
dramatically illustrated. 
E:ROPQSITION #5 
Marginal financial crowding-out effects induced by changes in government deficits seem to be 
of second-order importance. 
Tax-financed equal yield blocks additional changes in deficits and "a fortiori" blocks marginal 
financial crowding out. In turn, bond-financed and mixed-financed equal yield are in general 
accompanied by marginal financial crowding-out effects. The differences among the three equal 
yield schemes suggest the importance of marginal financial crowding out effects. 
Full integration results show slightly lower deficits under both bond-financed _ and 
mixed-financed equal yield, .0240/0 and .005% respectively. Therefore. no substantial changes in 
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the path of government indebtedness are induced. by corporate ~ tax integration. That is not 
surprising. since the corporate tax revenues foregone by integration are a~tually being collected at ' 
the personal income level. This is' essentially a constant, tax revenue experiment. 

On the other hand, the smafl changes in government indebtedness are negatively associated with 

the efficiency gains. Lower deficits are expected to generate favorable in~rginal financial crowding 
out effects. 'However, these remain unnoticeable in the simulation results. In fact, efficiency gains 
with tax-financed equal yield are always higher .than with ~ond-financed and mixed-financed equal 
yield despite the fact that the·latter two generate lower government debt. This ~uggests the second 
order importance of marginal financial crowding out vis-a-vis the additional distortions in the 
- intertemporal labor-leisure decisions. 
There .Is an interesting corollary' to this proposition. The fact th,at previous studies of 
- i 
corporate tax integration postulate balanced budgets, blocks not only financial crowding out but also 

marginal financial crowding out. The efficiency. results are still biased upwards in absolute terms 

. since financial crowding out is nQt considered. However, the absence of significant marginal 

,crowding-out effects suggests that the comparisons of different scenarios in the previous studiies 

may not be seriously biased. 
PROPOSITION #6 
The efficiency effects of partial integration are systematically negative. This is a new second- . 
lbest situation. ISimulation results for partial 'integration are reported in Tables 6-7. Partial integration 
r 
accomplished by dividend deduction from the corporate tax base, yields systematically negative I 
j 
~efficiency effects. The long-run negative effects are at best -.183% of present value of 
• 
II 
consumption and leisure in the case of tax-financed equal yield with multiplicative replacement. 

The persistently negative effects of partial integration contrast with the positive effects t?f full 

I 
t 
integration. ' This is an interesting second-best property of our economy. Partially alleviating 
l 
I 
I 
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distortions does not necessarily yield global efficiency gains. The" elimination of double taxatk)n 
does not" directly generate efficiency gains in terms of allocation of investrraent across sectors. On 
. the other han"d, the tax replacerrient. factors are su~stantially higher than under full integration. t 
r 
Therefore, large efficiency distortions in the intertemporal consumption and labor-leisure 
allocations are created. 
'"Fhe second-best nature of partial integration is in contrast with previous results in FKSW. 
Comparable results in FKSW show long-run efficiency g~ins of about .32% of the intertemporal I ) 
adjusted GNP. This is substantially lower than their full integration results. Still, there are 
efficiency gains from partial integration. Part of the difference between the results in DAGEM and 
FKSW should be attributed to fact that while both models capture intertemporal consumption and 
. ~ 
labor-leisure decisions, the endogenously recursive nature of equilibriufl}/in the DAGEM better 
\ 
captures the distortions induced by higher marginal income tax rates.., Another reason for the 
, 
difference between the two models may have to. do with the different types of replacement used in 
" 
the two works. FKSW us&d (ncrea.sed corporate tax rates, not personal tax rates, as a replacement 
,mechanism. Therefore, the primordial distortions on the intertemporal labor-leisure decisi()ns 
are not operating in FKSV'I. However, increased marginal corporate tax rates increase the wedge 
between the corporate and non corporate sectors and introduces additional distortion into the 
allocation of capital in the economy. 
This second-best result in this work should be interpreted with some care. The partial 
integration mechanism alleviates not only the double taxation of dividends but also the distortion in 
favor of debt financed investment against equity. Partial integration should induce lower 
debt-equity ratios and improved investment financing efficiency. In this sense the simulation 
results with the DAGEM may be biased downwards. In fact, corporations are not allowed to react to 
the partial integration mechanism by optimally adjusting the corporate financing rules, namely the 
debt-equity ratios. This source of efficiency gains from integration is not captured by the DAGEM. 
\' 
..... 
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Fullerton-Gordon (1983) provide unique information of how .important the effects are of 
. , 
dividend deduction under endogenous corporate 'financial beha~ior. They report efficiency gains of 
.6% of the GNP from the elimination of the tax distortions favoring debt. Given the size of the 
results reported here., it. does not seem likely that n:taking corporate financia~ .decisions. endogeno~s 
in the DAGEM would change the qualitative nature of the results, in particular the second-best 
.. 
property. 
Two final remarks are in order. First. ~nder partial integration the first-order importance of 
the distortion in the intertemporal labor-leisure decisions is confirmed. .The case of tax-financed 
equal yield. under multiplicative replacement requires the lowest marginal changes in personal 
income tax rates. It also shows the lowest ~fficiency losses. Also, this case is unique in tbat it, 
violates the intertemporal pattern discussed in Propositi0'1 2. Long-term losses are on average
. // 
, / , 
-'higher than short-term losses. However, this case is also unique in th~1 the average replacement 
factor is higher in the long run thari in \the short run. Secondly, th.e secondary order of marginal 
financial crowding-out effects is illustrated here again. Bond-financed and mixed-financed equal 
yield generate slightly lower government deficits than tax-financed equal yield. Despite this fact, 
tax-financed equal yield generates the lowest losses. 
Distributional Effects of Integration 
The distributional effects of integration are reported in Tables 8-10. All the results are 
obtained under full integration with multiplicative tax replacement. 
PROPOSITION # 7 
Intertemporal utility gains from integration are positively correlated with wealth. In turn, 
wealth gains from integration are negatively correlated with wealth . Therefore , utility gains and 
wealth gains are negatively correlated. 
Intertemporal utility gains from integration are positively correlated with wealth. High 
.... 
. ,f 
I 
J 
f 
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income households benefit most from integratio-n i~ terms of cbanges in intertemporal utility. 
They witn~ss an increase of above 12% in the present value of their consumption and leisure. In 

turn the lowest income class suffers a utility loss of about -6.50/0. The i[ltertemporal utility of the 
 r 
middle income group remains essentially unaltered. To. summarize, integration is not Pareto 
improving in terms of its utility effects. 
Wealth gains from integration are negatively correlated with wealth. Low income households 
benefit most from integration in terms of changes in wealth ownership. Their wealth increases 
about 70/0. In turn, the highest income class group shows a wealth increase belc:w 10/0. It should be 
noticed that. integration is Pareto improving from the standpoint of wealth accumulation. 
Utility gains and wealth gains are negatively correlated. The highest income group shows the 
highest utility gains and the lowest wealth accumulc;ltion gains. Inversely, t~e rowest income group 
. / 
'shows the lowest utility gains (actually a utility loss) and the highest yJealth accumulation gains. 

Accordingly, in the DAGEM the "owest\ income groups behaves with the highest savings elasticity 
 ~ 
. with respect to interest rates. The highest income group, in turn, prefers to use the additional [ 
available" income to finance current consumption and leisure: 
Comparatively, in FKSW utility and income effects are both U-shaped a~d Pareto optimal 
improvements. Simulations in the DAGEM also suggests that the policy of tax integration is 
virtually Pareto optimaL Even those who experience reduction in current consumption and 
leisure, experience simultaneously the highest increase in wealth accumulation. Therefore they 
have the potential for higher gains in the future. 
PROPOSITION #a, 
Integration induces small changes in the private capital formation. The highly incorporated 
sectors gain the most with tax integration. 
Integration induces sJTIall changes in the private capital formation. Sector 1 (the primary 
sector essel1tially) shows a decrease in the capital stock. On the other hand, the other three sectors 
J 
1 
I 
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Iwhich have relatively high degrees of incorporation s~ow increased ,capital stock. The elimination 
of the corporate income tax 'eliminates the wedge in price of capital for the' corporate sector. 
-I 
Therefore int~gration induces a' re-allocation of inve.stment in the eqonomy in favor of ~he l 
corporate sectors. The sector with highest degree of incorpor'ation - Sector 3 (manufacturing 
- it sector essentially) gains the most with tax integratioh in terms of capital. a~cumulation - about a 
i1% increase: I 
1 
I 
It should be noted that the gains in capital. accumulation are relatively small when compared I , 
! 
with FKSW. That has to do with the modeling in the DAGEM of an investment .behavior induced by i 
adjustment costs. Capital is not fully mobile intersectorially and it takes time for capital to adjust 
- to its optimal levels. 
4.3 kQ.rj)orate TAX integration under the r;urrent Tax Law 
PROPOSITION #9 
The absolute efficiency gains from integration unde; the Tax Reform Act of 1986 are still 

lower than under the prevlous tax regime. However, the simulation results present the same 

general characteristics as under the previous tax regime. 

The efficiency results of tax integration under the current tax regime, the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, are reported in Tables 11-14. The absolute efficiency gains from integration under the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 are still lower than under the previous tax regime. Long-run gains from full 
integration with tax-financed equal yield and multiplicative replacemant are abo,ut .3% of the 
present discounted value of consumption plus leisure. In turn, integration under bond-financed and 
mixed-financed equal yield generates long-run benefits which are at best .2%. 
The intertemporal pattern of efficiency gains is even more marJ,ed under the current tax law. 
In the short .run the net efficiency gains from integration are virtually zero. Only in the long run, 
53 
f 
the "benefits became noticeable. 
The differential in the efficiency benefits from integration under, the previous and the currEmt 
tax regimes can be attributed to several factors. First, the lower 'efficiency gains under the 
current tax law go hand-in-hand with systematically higher replacement rates. The need for I 
,higher tax replacements is Justified by the higher corporate tax reve~ues generated under the new 

tax law, together with lower personal income tax revenue. Recall that one idea behind the Tax 

Reform was to shift some of the tax revenues from the per~onar to the' corporate income levels. In 
 I 
I turn, higher replacement rates generate highe'r distortio"ns in the intertemporal labor·leisure 

decisions. .A second reason for smaller benefits under the new tax law is that government optimally 
 Iincreases public deficits by about 200/0. Financial crowding·out effects are therefore much higher 
. under the new tax code than under the previous tax regime. 
/ 
At any rate, the difference in efficiency benefits from. integration' under the previous and 
current tax regimes provides an" indidation o'f. th~ implicit value of the Tax Reform of 1986 in I 
"­
terms of corporate tax integration, i.e., in terms of the elimination of distortions associated with 
1
, the corporate income" tax. 61 Gains from integration- under the- new tax regime might have been t 
lower or greater than under the previous tax regime. Under the current law there are lower 
.t 
distortions in the allocation of capital within the 'corporate sectors together with lower distortions 
in terms of corporate dividend-retention decisions. HowBver, higher effective corporate tax rates 
and the necessity for higher personal income tax replacements work in the opposite direction. 
PROPOSITION #1 Q 
The absolute distributional effects of integration under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 are smaller 

than under the previous tax regime. However, the simulation results preseilt the same general 

characteristics as under the previous tax regime. 

The distributional results of tax integration under the current tax regime, the Tax Refor~ Act 

of 1986, are reported in Tables 15-17. The effects of integration on the intertemporal utility 

t 
t 
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value of consumption and leisure show the same pattern as ~ under the previous tax law. 

Intertemporal utility gains from integration are positively correlated with. wealth. However, the 

. effects are now smaller in absolute value. The low~st -income class loses about 3.50/0, while the 

highest income class gains about 10.5%. 
The effects of integ ration on the wealth accumulation show the sarlJe pattern as under 'the 
previous tax law. Wealth gains from integration are negatively correlated with wealth. The effects 
are again smaller in absolute value. The lowest income 91ass shows a 4.5% increase in wealth 
accumulation, while the gains for the two other income groups are negligible. . 
IntegraHon under the new tax law induces even smaller changes in the private capital 
formation. Still, the highly incorporated sectors gain most with tax integration. In turn. the 
unincorporated sector witnesses a decrease in capital formation. 
./ 
! 
4.4 Senslyity Analysis 
This section provides information about the sensitivity of the simulation results with respect 
to changes in the corporate financing policy rutes as well as with respect to changes in the rules of 
formation of expectations. The sensitivity analysis focuses on the case of tax financed fun 
integration with multiplicative replacement, the best integration scenario. 
Effects of Changing Corporate Financing Rules 
The analysis centers on Sector 2, the sector with the highest degree of incorporation. Together 
with integration, Sector 2's debt-equity and retention-dividend parameters are changed in the 
revised case simulations. Results are reported in Tabfe 18. 
PROPOSITION #11 
Simulation results are rather robust to the specification of debt-equity and dividend-retention 
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parameters., 
Recan that full integration eliminates the tax preference of debt against equity .. Accordingly, 
ir)tegrati?n tends to decrease the debt-equity ratio (and increase the equity-capital ratio). 
However, the behavioral mechanisms that would dictate such an adjustment are not modeled in the 
DAGEM. In particular, the 'DAGEM model does not capture bankruptGY costs. Simulation results 
show small variations around the central equity-capital ratio of .3. Both in the short run and in 
the log run, efficiency gains from integration decrease wi~h increases in the equity-capital ratio. 
- ' 
This seems a counterintuitive result. The reader is warned against a behaviOral interpretation of 
this pattern: It is enough to say that simulation results are robust -with respect to the specification 
of debt-equity ratios. 

, 

Full integration eliminates the tax preference of retained earnil"!9s against dividends. 

\ / 
,Accordingly, integration tends to decrease the retention-dividend "ratio (and decrease 'the 
retention-.profit ratio). However, the \ behavioral mechanisms that would dictate such an t 
•
f 
adjustment are not modeled in the DAGEM. The changes in the simulation results induced by I 
\ changes in the retention- dividend parameter are negligible. Simulation results incr~ase slightly 
as the retention-dividend decreases. It is enough to say that simulation results are very robust 
with respect to the specification of retention-dividend ratios. 
Effects of Changing the Rules of Formation of Expectations 
In the previous sections static expectations were assumed for the sake of comparability with 
previous literature. However, it is crucial to try other rules of formation of expectations and see 
how the simulation resuits are affected. Simulation results are reported in Table 19. 
PROPOSITION #12 
The rules of formation of expectation dramatically affect the results of corporatf!.. tax 

integration. Myopic expectations are a "saddle-point H result. 

\ ' 
J 
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The rules of formation of expectation" dramatically affect the results of corporate t~x 
integration. With constant and common rates of price growth, the higher the expected rate of 
inflation the lower the gains from integration. In fac!, benefits are typically negative even with 
this best case scenario. of tax-financed equal yield with multiplicative' replac~ment. For the other 
rules consldered ~ adaptative expectations and extrapolative expectations - efficiency gains are 
positiv~ and comparable with myopic expectations. 
My.opic expectations are a "saddle-point" result. Six out of nine parameterizations of the rules 
of formation. of expectations yield lower results. This suggests that the re"sults in previous sections 
are plausible as "centra'" reference values for the effects of corporate tax integration. Also, the 
p'revious literature, assuming myopic expectations, may be overoptimistic, in the evaluation of the' 
potential gains from integration. 
! 
4.5 policy Implications' 
There are important policy implications to be drawn from the simulation results in 1this 
dissertation. The simulation results cast serious doubts on the desirability of repealing the 
corporate income tax in the U.S.. This works goes beyond the previous literature to suggest that 
integration may not be a good idea. The benefits of the full integration experiments may be too 
small when compared to the implementation and compliance costs of an actual policy. At any rate, 
integration efficiency gains are at best very modest. Corporate tax integration is certainly not a 
panacea. 
Nevertheless, if the goal of corporate tax integration is to be pursued several aspects should be 
considered. First, the choice of integration strategy is crucial for the success, if limited, of the 
policy. Second, it is going to take some time for the full benefits of these policies to shoy! up. 
Political costs should be expected in the short run before the benefits became apparent. Third, low 
t 
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income groups are likely to lobby against tax integ-ration. In fact they will experience some 

welfare loss. However, this welfare reduction is coupled with an increase.in wealth accumulation. 

. . 
. Ultimately, the welfare of the lower income class~s 'will also increase. Also, corporate tax 
integration may be attacked on grounds of favoring the high income groups. In reality the policy is 
virtuaUy Pareto optimal. It is not obvious who gains more ultimately.. Those who experience 
'esset gains 'in current consumption and leisu~e, also experience increased wealth accumulation. 
Therefore they have the potential for higher gains in toe future. Fourth, simulation resiJlts 
suggest that arguments in terms of the potential negative effects of integration through bigger 
government· deficits may not be fundamental. Finally, price expectations playa crucial role in lthe 
degree of success of integration. Efforts to develop constant prices and within some time lag 
constant price expectations may guarantee a result sufficiently close to the best scenario. 
. . / 
! 
f5· Spmmary and Concludjng Remarks I 
I 
fThe objective of this paper is to study empirically the efficiency and distribution effects of 

integrating corporate and per~.onal income taxes. This work attempts to provide 'a comprehen~ive 

account of both the economic ~nefficiencies eliminated by integration, and the distortions which are 

thereby created. With 'that objective, this paper develops a dynamic sequential general equilibrium 

model of the United States economy - DAGEM - with optimal intertemporal investment decisions and 

optimal allocation of investment across sectors, intertemporal household consumptionlleisure 

decisions, and endogenous government deficits and financial crowding out. 

Simulation results suggest first that the net welfare gains from integration are at best very 

modest and frequently negative. Such a dramatic change in tax codes, such as the complete 

elimination of the corporate tax and its replacement by increased personal income tax rates, is 

simulated to' yield long-run benefits which are never larger than .17% of the present value of 

I 
\ . 
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future consumption and leisure. This is between four-times ~nd twelve-times lower than 

comparable results available in the literature. Secondly, it ·takes time for the efficiency gains of 

integJation to appear. In particular, the average long-run gains are more than three times as large 

as the average short-run gains. This new intertemporal pattern of efficiency' effects Is due to the 

existence 9f costs of adjustment, and reflects an adjustment lag in the interindustry investment 

decisiC?ns. Thirdly, partial integration, achieved by excluding dividends from the corporate tax 

. base, ~ystematically generates negative effects.' This is a new second-cest effect suggesting that 
less than c~mplete integration may have perverse efficiency effects. fourthly, ~nlike results in 
previous studies. integration is shown not to be a Pareto improvement action. In terms of the value 
.of current consumption and leisure. the lowest income groups are worse off after the policy" 
implementation. However, all income classes show an . increase . in we}lIUl accumulation and, 
\ . 

"therefore, the potential is there for welfare gains at some point in the/future•. Fifthly, under the 

Tax Reform" Act of 1986, the effects of integraUon show the same patterns and characteristics as 

under the old tax regime. However, under the new tax law the efficiency gains of integration are 
 I 
. much lower. This suggests that the change in tax regimes in itself improved efficiency. In 

particular, the efficiency gains from both the new tax treatment of capital gains and depreciation 
 I 
allowances and the elimination of the investment tax credits dominate the additional distortions 
generated by an increase in the effective corporate income tax rates. ­
On a different vein, the results of the simulation experiments confirm the crucial importance 
of the marginal distortions in the labor-leisure decisions induced by the tax replacement 
mechanisms: the higher the marginal increases in the personal income tax rates the lower the 
efficiency gains from integration. In addition, the importance of marginal financial crowding out is 
confirmed: higher government deficits are associated with lower integration benefits. Also, the 
importance of expectations is illustrated: different rules of formation of expectations and _even . 
different parametrization of the same rule lead to clear changes in the effects of the policies 
\ 
, 

~ 
I 

Iconsidered. Finally. the simulation results are very robust to 4different specifications of the 
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debt-equity and dividend-retention parameters as was expected given the .essentially deterministic . 
context of the model. 
Despite the contributions brought forth by the previous literature and this paper to the 
understanding of the effects of corporate tax integration. there is still an ,area that remains' to be 
comprehensively studied: the changes on optimal financial decisions induced by tax integration. In I
!,
the DAGEM, real private investment is financed by retained. earnings and issuance of new debt and I 
equity according to exogenously defined corporate financing and divide,nd-retention rules. 
Government finances deficits by issuing bonds. Household asset portfolio decisions merely 
accommodate to the composition of demand for funds - private assets and public bonds. 
The integration of the corporate and personal income taxes should be ~xpected to change the 
/, 
optimal household portfolio decisions. In' fact. the different rates of return of the different 

, 

financial assets change with integration. By, not letting the households optimally adjust their 

, 
. portfolio to the new market conditions after integration, a source of efficiency is not accounted for. ,I 
,Therefore~ the results in this work may be biased downwards. 
Slemrod (1980) models optimal household portfolio decisions in a static environement 'and 
obtains benefits from integration which are twice as large as those reported in FKSW. Part of the 
difference has been attributed to the fact that Slemrod's model is static and labor supply is 
exogenous. However. let us assume for a moment that the difference in efficiency between 
Slemrod's results and FKSW's results could be attributed entirely to the optimality of household 
portfolio allocation. (Notice that this is highly unlikely since it was already stressed that the 
distortions in the intertemporal labor-leisure decisions represent a major efficiency cost of 
integration.) Let us also assume that the results of DAGEM with optimal portfolio decisions would 
also be twice as large vis-a-vis the current formuiation. The main idea in this paper that the 
benefits of integration are at the very best modest would stiil hold true. 
I 
\ 
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The integration of the corporate and personal income taxes sho.uld be expected to affect th~ 

optimal corporate financial rules and dividend-retention pO,licies. With integration, the tax 

preference towards bonds against equity disappears or is alleviated. Therefore, the debt-equity 

I• ratios in the different corporate sectors would tend to decrease after in!egration.· Also, with 

integration !he tax preference towards retained earnings against dividends disappears. Therefore, 

the di~idend-retention ratios in the different corporate sectors would tend to increase after 
 I 
. 	 integra!ion. However, in the event that integration induces higher government deficits, the t 
corporations may want to react by using internal funds more intensively. In this case, the net 
effect of integration on the dividend-retention ratios would be ambiguous. At any rate, by not I 
-letting the corporations adjust their debt-equity ratios and dividend- retention policies to the new. I 
i
market conditions after integration, some efficiency effects, of integr~tion ~Je "''not accounted for. 
. 	 / l 
therefore. the results in this work may be biased downwards. In fact, it was already suggested that I 
the second-best nature of the partial 'integration results may be ~ssentially due to the . lack of ( 
I 
~ 
optimal corporate financial rules and dividend policies. While the adverse conditions for equity 
II 
,Issuance and dividend payout disappear or are attenuated when dividends are exempted from the f 
,r corporate income tax base, the model assumes that financial rules and retention policies do not 
change. I 
Fullerton-Gordon (1983) and Galper-Lucke-Toder (1986) optimally model the debt-equity I 
rules by trading off the tax preference of debt against the potential bankruptcy costs of equity I
~financing. Predictably, integration is simulated to generate substantial changes in the optimal 

debt-equity rules. However, the changes induced on the overall efficiency results by changes in the 

I 
I
optimal debt-equity rules are not discussed by either Fullerton-Gordon or Galper-Lucke·Toder. 

That may in fact suggest that changes in overall efficiency results are not substantial. 

Furthermore, the effects of optimal changes in the dividend payout rates weren't ever discussed in 
 I 
the previous literature either. 
.. 
- -
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Modeling uncertainty in a non-trivial way (recall that· in the DAGEM uncertainty is 
"eliminated" by using point expectations) seems to be the only promising approach t9meaningful 
tr~atmen.t of both optimal corporate financial decisions and optimal household portfolio decisions. 
In a stochastic co"ntext, optimal portfolio decisions may be addressed :vithin a capital'-asset­
pricing-model framework (see Merton (1973) for seminal work along these lines). Also, 
corporate financial rules may be addressed by trading off in a stochastic environement the 
preference of debt against the potential bankruptcy costs of equity financing. Despite the 
advantages of the stochastic analysis, general equilibrium modeling and implementation in a 
stochastic setting 'is a very complex enterprise which is outside the scope of this paper. 
I .1 II• 
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FOOTNOTES 
1/ 
See Pereira (1988) for a full documentation of the' DAGEM model. 
21 
The intertemporal optimization problems are solved using Pontryagrin's Maximum Principle. to 
yield optimal net demand functions. 
31 
These assumptions are sufficient for existence and uniqueness of optimal intertemporal output 
plans even with constant returns to scale technologies. See Pereira (1987)' on this issue. 
, 4/ 
// 
The base case with the DAGEM essentially reprodurp.s the main re'atio~Ships in the U.S. economy . 
. In particular, household behavi~r. implies an, average savings elasticity with respect to interest 
rate of .20. This is well within the range of values in use in the literature .. (see BFSW for 
example}. On the other hand, household behavior implies an average labor supply elasticity with 
respect to wage rate of 1.11. This value is at the upper bounds of the set of acceptable values (see 
Lu'cas-Rapping (1970». 
51 
Recall that the model is run for a period of twenty years in a decision time-horizon of one 
hundred years. In this section short-run refers to the first 10 years, long-run to the whole 
twenty years. 
6/ 
The implementation of a stilized version of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the context of the 
DAGEM model is simulated to yield general efficiency gains over the previous tax regime of as much 
as 2.5% of the present discounted value of future consumption plus leisure. 
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.APPENDIX I 
DAGEM - NOTATION 
1-. General Notation 
I1m.e. 

current time 

... terminal time 

future time 

Agents 

consumers 

producers of consumption goods 

.producers of physical capital 

government 

Commodities 

consumption of good j by i 

labor supplied by i 

leisure of i . 

total available time of i 

consumption good j 

value added by j 

total investment cost by j 

adjustment costs 

use of input f by j 

capital stock in sector j 

investment by industry j 

total demand for investment by j 

labor used by industry j 

investment good 

use of good j by g 

capital stock demanded by g 

investment by 9 

labor demanded by g 

Financjal FlowS and Assets 

wealth of i 

savings of i 

j-th industry bonds owned by i 

j-th industry equity owned by i 

dividends from j received by i 

1 

z 

T (finite) 

zstsT 

group i=1, •.. ,C 
industry j=1,••. ,J 
- industry j=1 
g 
Yijt 

L·
1,7t ",; 

~it 
! • 
:L i 
Yjt 
VAjt 
TCjt 

C j(.) 

Yjft 

Kjt 
Ij t 

Ijt+Cj(.) 

Ljt 

It 

Yjgt 

Kgt 

Igt 

19t 
Wit 
Sit=Fjt 

B ijt 

Eijt 

Div"tIJ 
i 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

t 

t 
government bond~ owned by i 
ils share of the market portfolio 
share of debt in ils portfolio 
share. of equity j in ils portfolio 
j-thls net cash flow 
j·thls g~oss/quasi profits 
j-th industry bonds 
j-th industry capital equity 
sector j liabilities 
dividends distributed by j 
retained earnings by j 
new funds demanded by j 
government bonds 
.government liabilities 
new funds demanded by g 
labor tax revenue 
corporate tax 
investment tax credit 
income tax 
'sales tax 
total taxes 
transfers 
prjces 

consumption good j 

vector of consumption goods 

physical investment 

labor 

interest rate 

price of equity j 

Optimal demands are referred to by superscript 
2 I 
Bigt . 
sit I 
1-1:-e'tJ . J 
8jt 
NCFjt I 
njt 
Bit I 
Ejt 
FLjt 
Divjt 
REjt 
Fjt 
Bgt 
LGt 
Fgt 
LTt 
CT '" "'~ 
,}TCt 

, IT 
t 

STt 

Trt 
TTt I 
Pjt 
Pt 
Pit 
PLt 

rt 

PjEt 

D. Optimal supplies are referred to by 
superscript S. Predetermined stock variables at z are denoted by a superscript .. and do not have 
time subscript. Future expected prices are referred to by superscript e. 
2. Structural parameters 
preference and Techno!oQY parameters 

group its discount rate 

Cobb·Douglas j-th share 
3 
Cobb-Douglas labor share 
Leontiff parameters 
Cobb-Douglas labor share 
Cobb-Douglas capital share 
adjustment costs parameter 
j-th's capital depreciation rate 
dividend/retention parameter 
new debt/equity paramenter 
government discount rate 
Cobb-Douglas labor share 
Cobb-Douglas capital share 
Cobb-Douglas j-th good share 
g's capital depreciation rate 
Tax parameters 
income tax rate 
income tax rate intercept 
capital gains. tax 
transfers received by i 
sales tax rate 
labor tax rate 
j's corporate tax rate 
j's investment tax credit 
j's depreciation allowances 
j's depreCiation for tax purposes 
1-Ijaij 
ait 
aj 
1-aj 
bj 
0jt 
0 njt 
0 Ejt 
Og 

BgL 

BgK 

8 gj 

0 gt 

Tit 
bit ... 
yGTit 
l 
/TrU 
Tjt 
Tlt 
Tcjt 
ITCjt 
D~jt 
o jt 
\ 	
..L 
4 

APpeNDIX II 
PAGEM - EQUILIBRIUM CONDITJONS AND TRANSITIONS 
. 
1. 	 EQuilibrium' Conditions 
..Consumption GOQds Markets: for j=1 , ... J: 
(A.1) i iY 0 ijt(Pt;P*t;¥i} +Y 0 IU(Pt;P * t;~ I}+Y 0 jgt(Pt;P*t;¥g} + 
+ 2, 1sfsJY 0 fjt(Pt:P * t;¥f}=Y S jt(Pt";p * t;¥j} . 
(A.2) yS jt= K *j{[( 1 + T Lt}PLt]/aj[Pjt- 2,f(ajfpft}]}aj/(ar 1 ) 
(A.3) yO jft=ajfK*j{[(1 + T Lt}PLt]/aj[Pjt"2,f(ajfPtt}]}ai(ar 1} 
(A.4) 	 y.olft==aIfK~I{[(1+TLt}PLt]/al[plt-2,f(aIfPft}]}al/(al-1} // 
.! 
o . 	 I(A.S) Y gjt=[agj(1 +rt})/[qgtPjt] 
(A.S) yO ijt- a ij{ 1 + (1"- T it) [( 1 - 2, je jt) r t+ 2, je jt( 0 iv jt/Pj Et -1 E jt} J}/{ q it( l' + T jt) Pjt} I 
l 
f
-Labor Market: 
(A.7) 2, jL 0 jt(Pt;P * t ;¥j) + L 0 It(Pt;P * t;¥I} + L 0 gt(Pt;P*t;¥g) -LjLS it(Pt;P .., t;¥j) 
(A.S) L 0 j t == K * j { ~ ( 1 + T L t) P L t ] Ia j [ P j tOO 2, f ( a j f P f t) ]}11 (aj- 1 ) 
(A.9) L 0 It- K * d[( 1 + T Lt) PLt]/a,[p It-2,f(aIfPft)]}1/( al-1 } 
(A.10) LO gt=[ag L(1 +rt)]/[qg~(1 + T gLt)PLt] 
* 	 S(A.11) L rL it­
[ (1 - 2, j a i j) (1 + ( 1 .. Tit) [ ( 1 .. 2, je j t) r t + 2, je j t ( 0 i v j t l PjEt -1 E j t) ] ] I q it( 1 .. Tit) P L t 
-Investment Good Market: 
... 

S 

(A.13) IT0jt=IOjt+.Sbj(IDjt)2 
(A.14) 10 jt=[1/bj]{(1 +rt+1 r 1qjt+1-(1-ITCjt)PIt]} 
I 

(A.1S) ITDIt=I°It+.Sbl(l0It) I 
(A.16) 10 1t=[1/bl]{(1 +rt+1 r 1qlt+1-(1-ITC It)PIt]} 
0(A. 17) 1 9 t = a 9 k'{q9 t [ Pit- (1 + r f+ 1 ) -1 (1 - 0 9 t + 1 ) Pit+.1 ~ ( 1 + a9 ) (1 + r t) -1 } - (1 -"9 t) K • t 
(A.1 8) 1S t = K • I { [ ( 1 + T L t) P L t]'a1 [Pit-1:f ( af IP f t) ]} a I' (a1- 1 ) 
-Financial Market: 
o 0 	 - t (A.22) F 1t=(1-ITC It)PItI 1+(1-Tclt)rtBlt+(1-CGTjt}[PjEt-PjEt_11Ejt-REU'-0ItK 
t. 
1 
o '. 0 	 D 0(A.23) F gt=rtLG +rrt+1:jPjtY gjt+(1 +T gLt)PLtL gt+PItI gt-TT t 
2., 	Transitions 
-Capital Stock 
o D •(A.26) K gt+1=1 gt+(1-0gt)K 9 
-Li abilities: 
s· D(A.28) B jt+1 =B j+(1-0Ejt)F jt 
f 
; 
6 
(A.29) PIEt ESjt+1= PIEt-1 E*j+0Ej'tFDjt 
(A.30) FLSjt+1 =BSjt+1 +PjEtESjt+1 
S * 0(A.31) B u+ t=B 1+(1-0EIt)F It 
(A.32) PIEtESIt+1 = PIEt-1 E*,+0EItFDIt 
(A.33) FLS It+ 1 =BS It+ 1 +PJEtES It+ 1 
·Iotal Wealth and Composition: 
/ (A.3S) W 0 it+ 1 - W * i+ b it+ (1- I it)[p LtLS it+ [( 1-Ljejt)rt+L je jt( Divjt/pj Et-1 E jt)]W* i] 
. , 
~ " 
(A.36) W it+1-LjBjjt+1 + B igt+1+LjPjEiEijt+1 
3. Specification of the Shadow prices 
I [IT ts hs s [ 1 + (1 • I ih ) [ ( 1 -L j ej h) rh + L j ej h ( 0 i vj hIPj E h -1 E j h ) I] ]} } 
i 
\ 
J 
t 
7 I 
(A.43) Ajh=(1.0 jhH1+rh+1 r1 	 I 
I 
f 
(A.44) Cjs= (1·Tcj s)[Pjs -~f( ajfP fs)]( 1.aj){ (1 + T LS)P Ls/aj[Pjs-:r.f( ajfPfS)]}al(ar 1 ) 
, " (A.45) 	 qgt={ (1·~k9)(1 +1/(1 +Og) T ·t+~t+ 1.S~ST -1 (1 +agr~ '­
.. - [ a kg·PIT. '1' ( 1 + a 9 ) T - t] [ (1 + r T ) 1[( 1 + r T ) PIT-1' - ( 1 - 0 j T) PIT] ] } I 
 I 
4. 	 Inter-Agent Transfers 
-REjt_ l?ivjt are given by 
f 
I 
. 	 .; 
(A.47) 0 iv jt= (1 -~njt)( 1-Tcjt){[Pjt- ~f( ajfp tt} ]yS jt- (1 + T Lt) PLt~_a jt} 
/ 
-TT t' 	Trt are given by . \ 
t, 

f(A.49) LTt=(~jTLtPLtLDjt)+ T 9LtPLtLD gt i
.( 
(A.50) OT t=~jTCjt[(Pjt-:LfafjtPft)ySj.-(1 +TLt)PLtLDjt-rtBjt] + 
+T clt[(PIt-!f8 ItPft) I S.- (1 + T Lt)PLt L0 It-rtB It] 
(A .51) 	ITCt=~ITC jtPIt[l D jt+ C j(1 0 jt)]+ ITC ItP 1t[1DIt+C 1(1 0 It)] 
(A.52) 	STt=~i[LjT jtPjtyD ijt] 
\ 
. i 
! 
• lI 
8 I 
-APPENDIX III 
DAGEM - POLICY EVALUATION.INDICATORS 
-Agoregate Short-Run Indicators: 
(A•.1) AS R EV t=Lj{exp[(Frjt-Fbit)ll:tssST( 1 +Ojr(S-t?J-1 }SRC F~it 
(A.2) AS RCVt=Li{1-exp[Frit-Fbit)/L~SSST(1 +Ojr(S-t)nSRCFrit 
-Aggregate LODg-Run Indicators: 
(A.3) / ! 
(A.4) 
-Indivjdual Short-Bun Expenditure Functions: 
.[Lja jjLn[aii(1 +Tjs)Pjs1+(1-Ljaij)Ln[(1-Ljaij)/(1-Tis)PLs] + 
. +Ln[(1 +Oir(s-t)n t+1 Shss(1 +rh>l]}/[LtssST(1 +oir(S-t)1} 
.. 

l 
r 

TABLE 1 . 

CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMER GROUPS IN THE DAGEM' 

CONSUMER GROUPS 

(Households classified by $Thousands of 1973 gross incom~) 

Group # 1 0-6 
Group # 2 6·15 
Group # 3 
INDUSTRIES 
S~ctor #1 
Sector # 2 
Sector # 3 
Sector # 4 
-Agriculture, Mining, Energy 
Food, Textiles, Paper, Chemicals, Lumber, Metals 
Trade, Finance, Real Estate, Services 
Capital: Construction, Tr?lnsportation, Machinery 
j 
TABLE 2 

BASE CASE PARAMETER VALUES AND STOCKS FOR EACH INDUSTRY 

. 

.. 
SECTOR 1 
Agriculture 
SECTOR 2 
Man ufactu ri ng 
SECTOR 3 
Services 
SECTOR 4 
Capital 
General Parameters . 
Cobb-Douglas Labor Share 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.5 
Adjustment Cost Parameter 0.035 0.02 0.025 0.016 
Depreciation Rate 0.099 0.07 0.067 0.085 
Equity/Capital 0.84 0.78 0.35 0.81 
Retention/Earnings 0.63 0.3 0.28 0.25 
Tax Parameters 
Old Tax Law 
Corporate Tax 
Investment Tax Credit 
Depreciation Rate (Tax) 
Labor Tax 
Sales Tax 
. 
. ; \ 
0.01 
0.038 
0.203 
0.09 
0.024 
.. 
0.46 
0.04 
0.13 
0.09 
0.02 
/
. 
" / 
! 
I 
0.3 
0.013 
0.124 
'0.09 
0.01 
0.45 
.. 0.039 
0.128 
0.09 
0 
Tax I'arameters 
Current Tax Law 
Corporate Tax 
Investment Tax Credit 
Depreciation Rate (Tax) 
Labor Tax 
Sales Tax 
0.01 
-
0.15 
0.09 
0.024 
0.3 
-
0.9 
0.09 
0.02 
. 0.2 
-
0.8 
0.09 
0.01 
0.3 
-
0.9 
0.09 
0 
Stock Values 
Capital 795 946 2509 110 
I 

I

! 
t 
t 
I 
I 
I; 
TABLE 3­
BASE CASE PARAMETER AND STOCKS FOR HOUSEHOLDS "NO GOVERNMENl 
LOW INCOME MED INCOME "UGH INCOME GOVERNMENT 
General Paramete.rs . 
CD Share of -Labor/Leisure 
CD Share-Sector 1 
. CD Share-Sector 2 
CD Share-Sector 3 
Discount Rate 
\Population Distribution-
Wealth Shares 
Dep.Rate of Governt Capital 
0.201 
0.011 
0.226 
0.562 
0.05 
0.38 
0.06 
-. 
, 
\ 
0.371 
0.008 
0.203 
0.418 
0.05 
0.41 
0.25 
-
0.65 
0.008 
0.19 
0 ..452 
0.05 /
/ 
0.21 / 
0.69· 
-
0.432 
0.004 
0.169 
0.062 
~ 
0.05 
-
w 
0.06 
Tax Parameters 
Old.Tax Law 
\ 
Personal Income Tax 
Capital Gains Tax 
. 
0.1 
0.05 
0.2 
0.05 
0.3 
0.05 
.... 
-
Tax Parameters 
Current Tax Law 
Personal Income Tax 0.08 0.15 0.25 ... 
Stock Values 
Government Capital Stock 
Public Debt 
-
... 
-
-
... 
... 
2670 
500 
I 

I 
j 
I 

I 

I 
TABLE 4 
EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF FULL IN-rEGRATION UNDER THE OLD TAX LAW 
FULL INTEGRATION 
. 
EQUIVALENT VARIATIONS 
short run long run 
(billions of 1.973 dollars) 
TAX REPLACEMENT FACTOR 
. 
short run long run 
bond financing 
multiplicative replacement 
, 
additive replacement 
10:195 55.475 
-34.545 -39.060 
. 
. 
" 
t.12~/ 
JI 
1..121 
I 
..028 ~027 
tax financing 
\ 
... 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
12.650 57.675 
-28.010 -34.585 
1.117 1.121 
.025 .026 
mixed financing 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
11.111 56.345 
-32.210 -37.100 
1.122 1.121 
.027 0.026 
f' 
l 
t. 
I
·1 
NB - Base Case Adjusted GNP is 34991.575 billion 1973 dollars 
. ; 
i 
t 
J 
f 
I 
; 
j 
f 
TABLE 5 
FURTHER EFFECTS OF FULL INTEGRATION UNDER THE OLD TAX LA.W 
FULL INTEGRATION 
-
.. 
GNP 
. Revised case/Base case 
. 
. 
. 
DEFICITS 
Revised case/Base case 
. 
0­
bond financing 
multiplicative replacement 
, 
additive replacement 
0.99881 
-
0.99893 
I 
\ 
.. 
. 
" ,/ 0.99976 
J 
/ 
! 0.99936, 
tax financing 
\ 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
. 
0.99876 
0.99887 
... 
1.0 by definition 
1.0 by definition 
mixed financing 
m u ltipl icative replacement 
additive replacement 
0.99879 
0.99891 
0.99995 
0.99969 
I 

, 
~ 
I
• 

I 

TABLE 6 
EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF PARTIAL INTEGRATION 'UNDER THE OLD TAX LAW 
,. 
PARTIAL INTEGRATION 
EQUIVALENT VARIATIONS 
short-run long-run 
(billions of 1973 dollars) 
. 
TAX REPLACEMENT FACTOR 
short-run 'long-run 
. 
bond financing 
. multiplicativ~ replacement 
\ 
additive replacement 
-39.445 -70.480 
-~24.025 -2~'4.875 
. I 
\ 
,,; 
1.246" 1.230 
I 
! 
.052 .049 
tax ~inancing , 
\ 
" 
m~ltiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
-31.825 -63.895 
-104.390 -223.33 
1.214 1.217 
.045 .046 
mixed financing 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
-36.605 -66.795 
-167.640 -236.105 
1.233 1.224 
.049 .048 
I
. I 
• 
NB - Base Case Adjusted GNP is 34991.575 billion 1973 dollars 
ft 
t 
r 
I 
t 
TABLE 7 
FURTHER EFFECTS OF PARTIAL INTEGRATION UNDER THE OLD TAX LAW 
-
. 
.. 
< PARTIAL INTEGRATION 
GNP 
Revised case/Base case 
. 
. 
DEFICITS 
Revised case/Base case 
bond financing 
< - multiplicative replacement 
.\ 
additive replacement 
-
0.99927 
0.99941 
I 
\ 
. 
.... 
/0.99579
. 
./ 
! 0.99559 
tax finanCing 
\ 
multiplicati~e replacement 
additive replacement 
0.99912 
0.99926 
... 
1.0 by definition 
1.0 by definition 
-
mixed financing 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
0.99922 
0.99935 
0 ..9976 
0.99745 
I 

I 

I 
I 

t 
l 
J ( 
t. 
l 

! 

I 
f 
f 
TABLE 8 . 
INTERTEMPORAL UTILITY CHANGES UNDER THE OLD TAX L'AW 
Revised case/Base case 
FULL INTEGRATION 
with 
multiplicative -replac. 
LOW I~'COMEGROUP MEDIUM INCOME GROUP " r,DGH INCOME GROUP 
/ 
! 
bond financing 
~ 
, 
\ 
0.92894 1.00966 1 .1126 
... I
, tax financing 0.94057 1.00991" 1.11g27 
mixed financing 0.93782 1.00982 1.11209 
, 
I 
• 
t 
I 
\ 
I 
i 
j 
J 
,. 
I 

I 

I 
TABLE 9 
y..'EALTH ACCUMULATION CHANGES UNDER THE OLP TAX LAW IRevised case/Base case 
, 
~ 
J 
FULL INTEGRATION 
with. 
m~ltiplicative replac. 
LOW INCOME GROUP MEDIUM INCOME GROUP I-!lGHINCOME GROUP 
! 
bond financing 
, 
1.07159 
, 
1 .01291 1 .00877 
" 
, tax financing 1.07077 1.01282 1.00874 
mixed financing 1.07094 1 .01288 
~ 
1 .00879 
t 
I 
I 
't 
TABLE 10 
GHANGES IN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION UNDER THE O~D TAX LAW. 
Revised Case/Base Case 
FULL INTEGRATION 
with 
multiplicCltive 
replacement 
SECTOR 1 
Agriculture 
SECTOR 2 
Man ufactu ring 
"" SECTOl}3 
Services 
,I 
SECTOR 4 
Capital 
Bond financing 0.99998 1.00949 1.00145 " 1 .00034 
tax financing 0.99998 1.00951 1.00146 1.00034 
mixed financing. 0.99998 1.00951 1.00146 1.00034 
t 
t 
f 
a 
• 
t 
~ 
,I 

I 

TABLE 11 
EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF FULL INTEGRATION UND~R THE CURRENT TAX" LAW I 
FULL INTEGRATION 
. , 
EQUIVALENT VARIATIONS 
short-run long-run 
(billions of 1973 dollars) 
. 
.. 
TAX REPLACEMENT FACTOR 
short-run ·Iong-run 
. 
bond fi,nancing 
. multiplicative replacement 
\ 
additive replacement 
-1.245 25.470 
-55.060 -84.. 800 
. I 
\ 
1.2~9 
.; 
1.218 
/ 
.029 .028 
tax financing 
\ 
"­
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
-.285 23.505 
-49.905 -84.730 
1.226 1.225 
.028 .028 
mixed financing 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
-.975 25.055 
-53.730 -84.405 
1.229 1.221 
.029 0.027 
I 
! 
I 
} 
NB - Base Case Adjusted GNP is 34146.579 billion 1973 dollars 
, 
I 
I 
TABLE 12 I 
FURTHER EFFECTS OF FULL INTEGRATION UNDER THE CURRENT TAX LAW 
. I 
. FULL INTEGRATION 
. 
GNP 
Revised case/8ase case 
. DEFICITS 
Revised case/Sase case 
bond financing 
multiplicative replacement 
\ 
additive replacement 
. 
0.99872 
0.99896 
, 
\ 
"'" 
,/1.00113 
/ 
! 1.00032 
tax financing 
\ 
.... 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
0.99874 
0.99895 
1.0 by definition 
1.0 by definition 
mixed financing 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
0.99873 
0.99895 
1.00091 
1.0003 
--
\ 
, 

~ 

I 

l 
TABLE 13 

EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF PARTIAL INTEGRATION UNDER THE CURRENT TAX LAW 
 I 

PARTIAL INTEGRATION 
.. 
EQUIVALENT VARIATIONS 
short-run long-run 
(billions of 1973 dollar~) 
. 
. 
TAX REPLACEMENT FACTOR 
short-run long-run 
. 
bond financing 
. multiplicative replacement 
, 
additive replacement 
-32.345 -64.570 
-98.065 -196.915 
~ 
, 
\ 
" 1.289/ 1.272 
/ 
I 
.035 .034 
tax- financing 
\ 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
-30.540 -60.900 
-90.795 -197.250 
.... 
1.283 1.279 
.035 .035 
I 
mixed financing 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
-31.850 -64.690 
-99.635 -198.030 
1.287 1.273 
.036 .034 
I 
1 
t 
I 
I 
NB - Base Case Adjusted GNP is 34146.579 billion 1973 dollars 
TABLE 14 

FURTHER EFFECTS OF PARTIAL INTEGRATION UNDER THE CURRENT TAX LAW 

PARTIAL INTEGRATION 
-­
.. 
GNP 
Revised case/Base case 
. 
. 
. 
DEFICITS 
Revised case/Base case 
. 
. bond financing 
multiplicativ$ replacement 
\ 
additive replacement 
-
0.99864 
0.99891 
I 
\ 
/ 1~001 01 
" 
./ 
/ 
I 1.00001 
tax financing 
, 
" 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
0.99865 
0.9S889 
1.0 by definition 
1.0 by definition 
mixed financing 
multiplicative replacement 
additive replacement 
0.99863 
0.99891 
1.00081 
1.00015 
I 

t 

\. 
.. 
f 
-
> 
, . 
. ~ 
"L 
. , 
f 
!• 
~ 
J 
I 
\ 
I 
, 
TABt:E 15 

INTERTEMPORAl U-rllITY CHANGES UNDER THE CURRENT .TAX lAW 

Revised case/8ase case 
fUll INTEGRATION 
/ 
with 
multiplicative r~p'ac. 
.\ 
LOW INCOME GROUP MEDIUM INCOME GROUP 
.. 
. 
HIGH-INCOME GROUP 
/', 
J 
bond financing 
, 
0.96554 I \ 1.00575 
. 
1.10798 
.. 
tax financing 
, 
0.96643 1.00541 1.10439 
mixed financing 0.96535 1.00553 1.1051 
• l 
I 
·FULL INTEGRATION 
with 
m~ltiplicative replac. 
LOW INCOME GROUP MEDIUM INCOME GROUP
. 
I:fJGR INCOME GROUP 
,I 
. bond financing 
. I 
1.04567 
, 
1 .00701 . 0.99967 
.... 
.. tax financing \ 1.04521 1.00739 1.00035 
mixed financing 1.04524 1 .00731 
A 
1 .00118 
TABLE 16 
WEALTH ACCUMULATION CHANGES UNDER THE CURRENT-TAX LAW 
Revised case/Base case 
1 
t 
J 
.. 

I 
\ 
;
; 
! 

TABLE ,7 
GHANGES IN CAPITAL ACCUMU.LATION lJNDER THE CURRENT TAX LAW 
Revised Case/Base Case 
1 
iFULL INTEGRATION with 
multiplicative 
replacement 
SECTOR 1 
Agricuiture 
SECTOR 2 
Manufacturing 
SECTOR 3 
"'" Servic~s 
.I 
.I 
SECTOR 4 
Capital 
Bond financing 
, 
\ 
0.99998 1.00626 1.00095 1.00036 
" 
tax financing 0.99998 1.00628 1.00095 1.00037 
mixed financing 0.99998 1.00628 1.00096 1.00037 
1 
\ 
t 
t 
I 
t 
TABLE 18 
SENSITIVITY RESULTS WITH RESPECT TO CORPORATE FINANCING RULES 
FULL INTEGRATION 
old tax law 
tax financed/mu It. rep. 
.. 
EQUIVALENT VARIATIONS 
short-run long-run 
(billions of 1973 dollars) . 
. 
NET CASH FLOW GNP 
Revised case/Base case 
. 
EQ UITY ICAPITAL 
(sector 2) 
..; 
0.. 2 
\ 
14.371 62.363 .9s1 1. 
/ 
, 
0.25 1'3.508 60.036 .986 1 . 
.... 
0.3 
.. 
, 
12.650 57.675 .986 1 . 
0.35 11.792 55.313 .985 1. 
RETAINED EARN/TOTAL 
(sector 2) 
0.73 12.650 57.682 .98601 1. 
0.78 12.650 57.675. .98600 1. 
0.83 12.650 57.666 
-
.98599 1. 
t 
J 
. I 
.Oi
-
I 

I 

t 
TABLE 19 
SENSITIVITY RESULTS WITH RESPECT TO EXPECTATION FORMATION RULES 
-
. 

FULL INTEGRATION 
old tax law 
tax' financ'e/mult. rep. 
EXPECTATION RULES 
. 
EQUIVALENT VAR,ATIONS 
short-run . long-run 
(billions of "1973 dollars) 
TAX REPLACEMENT FACTOR 
. short-run long-run 
myopic expectations 
o. 1. o. 12.650 57.675 1.125 1.121 
adaptatlve expectations 
\ 
o. .95 .05 
o. .90 .10 
15.605 61.150 
. 
, 
\ 
17.490 64.720 
..; 
,,/ 
/ 
1.114 1.120 
1.112 1.120 
o. • 80 .20 20.285 69.830 
... 
1.109 1.192 
, 
-extrapo lative expe-ctations 
o. 1.01 -.01 12.080 57.015 1.118 1.122 
o. 1.03 -.03 . 11.129 55.905 1.120 1.123 
o. 1.05 -.05 5.970 51.455 1.124 1.125 
constant rate of growth 
o. 1.01 o. -1.155 29.515 1.128 . 1.132 
o. 1.03 o. -29.894 -26.060 1.145 1.145 
. 
o. 1.05 o. -63.285 -87.195 1.157 1.161 
/ 
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